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This thesis explores the impact and importance of public
opinion in the American stratsgic/political planning
process. It begins with a discussion of the special role of
public opinion in the United States, how it has changed, and
how it effects policymakers. After a general consideration
of the uniqueness of that relationship, the role of public
opinion in determining the "national interest" is examined.
Two case studies are then presented. The first deals with
how a knowledge of existing public opinion on such general
areas as support for defense spending could be used by the
Executive branch to obtain support for a particular stra-
tegic policy, specifically; arms salas to foreign countries.
The second case deals with how a complex strategy related to
nuclear deterrence (deployment of the MX missile) was appar-
ently "adjusted" to gain public opinion support. The thesis
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I. INTR0D0CTI3H
The basis of our government [is] the opinion of the
people..
.
--Thomas Jefferson [ Hef . 1 : p. 49]
Public opinion in this country is everything.
--Abraham Lincoln [Raf. 2: p. 124]
The President, Mr. Iacocca observed, was involved in
"government by poll..."
— New Yor k Times, November 18, 1983 [Ref. 3: p. 14]
From its inception and throughout its history, the
impact and importance of public opinion in the policyfcrming
process of the CJnited States has been almost uniquely
evident. With the drafting of its constitution, this nation
was charged with incorporating the opinions of its citizenry
into the functioning of its governmental system [Ref. 4:
p.iii]. However, it has only been the developments in the
past few decades that have produced the means to fully
realize the concept of a government "by the people"; i.e.,
with the use of public opinion data.
Utilizing public opinion as a precise component of
policy input was hampered for many years by the technical
requirements of quantification. The government lacked a
means to rapiily obtain enough statistically significant and
unbiased opinion data. This obviated the immediate value of
mounting a collection effort. Concomitantly, the general
public also had information acquistion problems. The rela-
tively slow speed with which they were able to obtain infor-
mation about a subject or event affected whether their
opinions were formed on the basis of current information
(Ref. 5: pp. 3-5].

Technological advances, such as satellite assisted
communications and computer miniaturization, have reduced
the time lag problems associated with information transmis-
sion and opinion sampling. At the same time, the rise of
the Gallup, Roper, and Harris polling organizations (to name
just a few) attests to the increased importance assigned to
determining the publics opinion on a variety of subjects.
With current public opinion now so accessable to those
who make decisions, it must be considered as a factor in
U.S. strategic policy planning. To fail to do so creates a
situation wherein the government may make decisions that do
not reflect a clear under sxanding of societal needs and
concerns [ Ref. 6: p. 91].
The aforementioned changes brought about by the contin-
uing improvements in electronics have also had another
effect in regard to public opinion. The concept that elite
groups or the "attentive public" are the key to gauging
public opinion [Ref. 7:, p. 39], so often espoused by
writers on the subject, must be re-examined. A major
conduit of information, the TV news broadcast, has increas-
ingly become an integral part of the American culture
[Ref. 8: p. 48]. The "attentive public" has been enlarged
because of the increased ability ani propensity of TV owners
to, in fact, "pay attention". 1 Just what groups constitute
the "public" and what role public opinion should play in the
policymaking process must be reconsidered because of this.
^Recently the news program "60 Minutes" {albeit a "soft"
news program) reached the top of the TV viewer preference
surveys. Information that could impact on public opinion
was being transmitted to literally millions of Americans.
Information to be received, thought about, believed, acted
upon, or rejected. All this on a scale beyond imaginationjust twenty five years ago. The impact that this increase
in the amount of information could have on the O.S. demo-
cratic process is dealt with, in a very broad brush manner,
by John Naisbitt in Megat ren ds (Nsw York, N.Y.: Warner
Books. Inc., 1982), pp7"TTr7T7"l59-1 8 8. See also Charles 0.
Jones 1 comments on communications in An Introduction to the
Study of Pu bli c Policy, 2nd ed. (NoftE ScTEuaTeT lass.T
Euxb'ury'Press7~T977r7p. 22 .

A. THE "PUBLIC" IN PUBLIC OPINION
As indicated above, there is aors than ens "public" or
group usually considered when talking about the opinion of
the public and its impact on policy and strategy. The
concept that the "attentive public" is more influential than
the "mass public" is often integrated into a paradigm that
posits the American democratic prooess baing controlled (or
at least influenced) by "elite" gronps [Hef. 9: pp. 2-4].
These "elite" groups are generally made up of people with
similar interests who by reason of wealth, education, posi-
tion, or a combination thereof are prepared and able to
exert pressure on or within the government.
The existence and influence of these "elites" is readily
discernable. Is therefore the possibility of "mass" public
opinion also exerting an influence obviated? Does anyone
really care about or even listen to "mass" public opinion?
The idea that "mass" public opinion could make a differ-
ence in policymaking is not new. The question really is how
much of a difference it makes. Alan D. Monroe represents
one end of the spectrum of thought on the subject when he
states that, "...public opinion is typically a weak force."
[Ref. 10: p. 291] W. Lance Beniett, on the other hand,
characterizes public opinion as, "...the central regulating
mechanism in the political system." [Ref. 11: p. 12]
Significantly, however, despite the obvious dichotomy
between the two writers, even Monroe admits that, "In the
long run, the public almost always ge-s its way." [Ref. 12:
p. 292]
One is left with the impression that the answer to the
question concerning the amount of influence wielded by the
general public has not been definitively answered. Theories
of public opinion impact often depend on how the interwork-
ings of the government are interpreted by the various
10

authors on the subject. The next section deals with a
somewhat different means of ascertaining an answer to the
question of the "mass" public's influence.
B. THE ROLE OF "MASS" PUBLIC OPINION
It is beyond the scops of this paper to digress now into
a long discussion on how "mass" public opinion fits into the
various models of the governmental decisionmaking process. 2
Instead, we will examine the data obtained in a number of
surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization to obtain an
estimate of the relative importance and role of public
opinion in American policymaking.
1 . An "Elite" View of "Mass" Public Opinion
In November and December of 1982, the Gallup
Organization conducted a survey of 34 1 people drawn from
what would be considered "elites". These surveyed were
classified as leaders in the Reagan administration.
Congress, international business, labor, the news media,
religious institutions, academia, foreign policy organiza-
tions and special interest groups [ Ref . 13: pp. 87-88].
One of the questions asked was:
tant role or hardly an important role at all?
....public opinion...
2 The bases for many of the theories on the relative
importance of public opinion can be found in the previously
referenced books by V.O. Key (Public Opinion and American
January 1937, is also particularly useful 5§cause or its
discussion on the fallacies created by treating public
opinion as a monolithic whole. The other works on public
opinion cited throughout this presentation also provide




Of the elite leaders surveyed, 15 percent classified public
opinion as "very important". One would be inclined to eval-
uate the importance of public opinion as being low based on
that level of response. However, consider the data obtained
from the following question that was also asked:
Do you feel that the role of the following should be
more important than they are now, should be less impor-
tant than they are now, or should be about as important
as they are now? ....public opinion...
In response to this question, 36 percent of the "elite" felt
that public opinion should be "more important".
Taking both responses together, the possibility can
be seen to exist that over half of the "elite" may already
consider public opinion as a major factor in the policy-
forming process. While only 15 percent already thought it
was very important, it is logical to assume that the 36
percent who thought it should be more important would be
predisposed to make it so. Even if there was an overlap
between those responding in favor of public opinion in each
case, the fact t'hat "mass" public opinion is an increasingly
important factor in the thinking of those acknowledged to
control policy still remains clear. At a minimum, as James
Best points out, public opinion helps create the agenda of
issues that the leadership must adiress and how that agenda
will be handled [Ref. 14: p. 208]. Chapter Three provides
an example of that kind of situatioa.
2. A " Mas s" V i ew of "M ass " Public Opinion
The next point to be considered is the public
perception of the importance of public opinion. This can
give us an indication of the expectations of the American




In the aforementioned Gallup Organization survey, a
systematic, stratified national sample of 1,547 American men
and women [ Ref • 15-: pp. ix-xi] was also conducted [fief. 16:
pp. 87-88]. The same two questions were asked of this
"mass" sample as were asked of the "elite" sample. In the
case where public perception of the importance of public
opinion in foreign policy determination was measured, 23
percent thought it was "very important". However, 54
percent said that public opinion should have a "more impor-
tant" role in foreign policy formation then they perceived
it to have at the time.
In a similar vein, a 1975 Gallup Poll asked the
following question:
If the leaders of our nation followed the views of the
Eublic more closely, do you think the nation would be
etter off, or worse off than it is today? [Ref. 17:
p. 575]
In response to this question, 67 percent of those surveyed
felt that the nation would be better off, while 16 percent
felt it would be worse off. In both Gallup surveys,
however, the strong desire is expressed that policymakers
pay close attention to public opinion. 3
3 Implicit in this discussion has been the idea that the
"mass" public goes through an opinion forming process. The
various theories on that topic have been the focus of a
number of scholarly efforts. Many writers include as inputs
to the opinion forming process suoh items as: cultural
background, family influence, pser group, personality,
educational level, employment, major current evsnts< opinion
"leaders", news media imput, political party affiliation,
and religion: along with a host of other inputs. A detailed
discussion of the opinio!
the subject of a rather
authors cited elsewhere in this *pap<
this process are: W. Lance Bennett (Pub lic Opinion in
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C. CONCLUSIONS & QUESTIONS
It can be seen that policymakers are now faced with a
quantifiable public opinion, a level of public awareness,
and a degree of public interest unforeseen by the framers of
the Constitution. Additionally, the "mass" public now has
the expectation that its opinion will be fully considered.
The public's knowledge of issues, however, still tends
to be more generalized than that of its federal representa-
tives. Thus, the government is periodically forced to
function in situations where its psrcep-cion or articulation
of what is "in the national interest" does not always coin-
cide with public opinion [Ref. 18: pp. 90-91].
The dilemmas this creates for the American system of
democracy are many. The three that this paper will consider
are:
1) Given the ability to measure the publics opinion,
how much weight should it be given in the planning
process? In the broadest sense, who determines "the
national interest", the government or the people?
2) Given a strategic policy that the public hashistorically been unwilling to support, are there
related issues that could be useful in increasing, or at
least predicting, current levels of public approval?
3) Given a situation considered by the policymakers to
be too complex for the public to grasp, but coo impor-
tant or visible to be dealt with unobtrusively, how can
the support of public opinion be maintained?; or is that
support really necessary in such a case?
The next three chapters provide possible answers to
these questions. An operational definition of "the national
interest" incorporating the influence of public opinion will
be offered in Chapter Two. Chapters Three and Four are case
studies related to the above questions two and three respec-
tively. Finally, Chapter Five will present conclusions




II. WHO DETERMINES.THE .NATIONAL INTEREST?
Ascertaining who determines the national interest
presupposes that a "national interest" exists. It is neces-
sary therefore to define the term.
A. A DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Donald Nuechterlein defines the national interest in the
following manner:
The national interest is the perceived needs and desires
of one sovereign sTate in relation to the sovereign
states comprising its external environment. (Ref. 1 ^ :
P. 3]
Unfortunately, he does not clearly explain how the percep-
tion of needs actually occurs. However, he then goes on to
subdivide the general concept of the national interest into
four types of interests: 1) defense; 2) economic; 3) world
order; and 4) ideological [ Ref . 20: p. 4]. Whatever flaws
or inadequacies Nuechterlein' s formulation may have, he
clearly views the national interest as a tangible, knowable
entity. Conceptually, it can and should be used as a policy
tool.
Contrast this approach to the national interest with a
statement by James N. Rosenau:
In its [the national interest] action usage, the concept
lacks both structure and content but, nevertheless,
serves its users, political actors, well. As an analyt-
ical tool, the concept is more precise and elaborate
but, nevertheless, confounds the efforts of its users,
political analysts. [Ref. 21: p. 31]
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Rosenau interprets the idea of the national interest as
an attractive but shopworn concept useful for drumming up
political support for specific issues. It is an abstraction
with "face validity" that is ultimately unknowable because
human values are involved.
Nuechterlsin and Rosenau do not present the extreme
opposing ends of the spectrum in the conceptualization of
the national interest. They do plainly typify the disagree-
ment on the subject. Labels such as "pragmatist",
"realist", and "idealist" (to name just a few) which are
applied to writers on the subject give an indication of the
range and type of discord involved in the debate on this
matter. 4
Exploring the concept and literature of the national
interest is daunting at best and overwhelming at worst.
Aside from the works already cited in this chapter, an exam-
ination of the following items is useful for preceiving the
intricacies of the concept. Some of the most forceful pres-
entations come from Hans Morgenthau. His writings: "Another
•Great Debate*: The National Interest of the United States,"





Tn^eresTT """[""Critical Examination of
lief lean ForeianPoXic'7 ""TTewYork, ~tfTY7: ""Alfred* XT" "Knopf,
Inc. , "T95TTT and "The Mainsprings of American Foreign
Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions," The
Amer ican Polit ical S cience Review. December 1950; represent
important works in the tielcT" A" better understanding of the
philosophical underpinnings of the concept can be found by
reading Walter Lippmann, The Public^Philosophy, (Boston,
Mass.: Little, Brown, 19557*7" """Join RIEwIs, I The ory of
Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, "TyTTf
also treats this area. The idealist vs. realist debate is
well summarized in Warner Schilling, "The Clarification of
Ends or Which Interest is the National?," World Po lixics
1956. In that article. Schilling reviews and~3iscusses two
other notable works; Robert E. Osgood, Ideal s an d
Self-inter e st i n Am erica' s Fo reign Relations: TH"e~" Great
Transfor maton of t he Twen tTetS ^n"*fur*£""TCn"icago, 111.
7
"University ot CTficagcTTf ess""; T"953f along with Thomas I. Cook
and Malcom Moos, Power Th rough Purpose: The Realism of
Idealism as a Bas i s "To r F oreig n ""Policy (BaltTIore, Ma.7
JbEns~HopJclns""Press'". iyo<*) . Tnis writer found the Schilling
work, plus two others; Vernon Van Dyke, "Values and
Interests," American Political Science Review, Vol. 56. 1962
and Fred A. "~5ona"erman,"" "Tne Concept of the National
Interest," Orb is , Spring 1977; to be particularly thought
provoking. Some may also find Karl R. Popper, The Open
Society an d Its Enemies, 4th ed.
,
revised, 2 vols7
7Frinceton7 IT. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963) and
Virginia Held, The Public Int erest and Individual Interests
(n.p.. 1970) to 5*e of value Tn""puTITng ""various concepts




Viewing the controversy in a dispassionate manner, it
appears that, wh en considered as,an end^in itse lf , the
national interest inevitably becomes more of a generality
than a set of specific constants. It may be viewed as
essentially consisting of the six classic elements of
national identity: territory, population, economic system,
political/administrative system, military system, and value
system- However, added to these is the human element
[Ref. 22: p. 256].
Individuals or groups of individuals place different
definitions on and assign different relative weights to the
importance of each of the six elements. This is particu-
larly true when it is desired to maintain, at a minimum, the
nation's current status guo or, in other cases, gain the
ascendancy of particular goals. This leavening process
creates a conceptual construct that expands in strange and
unexpected ways when baked in the oven of public opinion and
debate. Attempts to interpret what the national interest is
from solely idealistic or realistic points of view generally
lead to unsatisfactory results.
Yet, the elements of the national interest pervade all
segments of the American system of governance. Because of
this, as Rosenau notes [Ref. 23: p. 39], attempts to
analyze it cannot be dismissed as wholly unproductive.
The problem in defining the national interest may come
from the implicit assumption by many that it somehow can be
permanently guantified. That is to say that America's
national interest can be stated in a few lines in a
dictionary with an occasional change noted in successive
publishings; just like any other bit of terminology.
This type of defining process appears to be of little
long term value. Even with all the discussion and debate,
no one who has "defined" the national interest has escaped
the need to insert some sort of interpretive process, no
17

matter how obliquely, into the "definition". There is
always some element of "it depends" in the interpretation.
Because of this, it seems logical to find another means
to frame the concept of the national interest. If it cannot
be satisfactorily described as an end, perhaps it should be
considered as a means to an end.
B. THE NATIONAL IHTEBEST AS A PBOCESS
To define the national interest as a means rather than a
end, as a process rather than an outcome, may seem dissatis-
fying. It removes the possibility of achieving a quick or
constant answer. However, since the structure of the
American democratic system is itself a dynamic, everchanging
process, it is reasonable to assume that the national
interest of the naticn it underlies should share those same
attributes.
Consider the following hypothesis:
The national interest is determined by a policymaking
process which satisfies national needs as defined by the
problematic context, in a legitimate 5 manner, resulting
in domestic compliance.*
5 The concept of "legitimacy" is yet another realm that
can be explores at length in its own right. A good overall
discussion of the subject was written by Dolf Sternberger in
"Legitimacy," Inte rnational Encyclopedia o f Social Sciences,
Vol. 9, David I. "SiTIs, ea., (n.p.T UroweTI7 CoTTTer ana
McMillian, Inc. and Free Press, Inc., 1968), pp. 244-248. A
excellent bibliography concludes his treatment of the topic.
See also Charles F. Kriete, Chaplain (Colonel), U.S. Army in
"The Moral Dimension of Strategy," Parameters: Jour nal of
the_O.S. Army War College. February""T9T7T" ErieflyT'Eougn",
X£ would seem fnaf quantified public opinion provides the
policymakers with a tool for determining the degree of
legitimacy that is afforded their policies by the general
population.
•The author is indebted to Professor Frank Teti of the
Naval Postgraduate School for the basis of this hypothesis.
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Does this do a better job of defining the national interest
than some other constructs?
As pointed out earlier, a major deficiency in most
definitions of national interest is the inability to make
allowance for the "it depends" factor. In the above
hypothesis, the national interest is fluid. The policy-
makers are free to make and change policy as they see fit.
They must however do so in such a manner so as to satisfy
national needs.
How are national needs determined? In a democratic
society, the "will of the governed" must be known, for it is
the people who constitute the nation. If policies are
considered by the people to be non-legitimate nor in their
own long term best interests, then some form of unrest
(i.e., a loss of domestic compliance) will occur.
A guick look at American "compliance" during the age of
Prohibition shows clearly what can occur. Policymakers of
that time did not appreciate the conseguences of the failure
to fully understand the national needs. The lesson was
painfully taught to the government again during the later
years of the Vietnam conflict, when the public as a whole
became disenchanted with administration policies [Ref- 24:
pp. 23-25].
It is the necessity to capture the intricacies of the
American culture that the proposed definition is designed to
reflect. Single issue oriented and/or rigid definitions of
the national interest lead to problems when attempting to
apply them to policy decisions in a complex environment.
The classic schools of thought on how to determine the
national interest fall prey to their own inflexibility. An
example is the use of morality as the underlying means for
determining it. As Paul Seabury points out, the use of this
broad, difficult to define concept creates a situation
wherein simplistic solutions are sought to a complex problem
19

[Ref. 25: p. 13]. Such simplicity does not point the way
clearly when dealing with a country whose concept of
morality differs frcm that of the U.S. The furor
surrounding the recent Soviet downing of a Korean commercial
airliner attests to this.
Similarly, definitions of the national interest based on
such diverse concepts as ,,realpolitilc ,, and idealism also
have problems of flexibility. Concepts such as these are
often beset with internal contradictions or excessive
subcategorization [Ref. 26: pp. 570, 576-577], caused by
the failure to compensate for the current mood of the
people.
The "process" definition of the national interest shall
therefore underlie the remainder of this presentation. This
is not to say that the definition is perfect. Rather, of
the myriad of definitions in existence, this one offers a
means of continuous evaluation as to whether the national
interest is being served. There is no need for caveats nor
categories, merely a knowledge that the needs of the
majority and therefore the needs of the nation are perceived
by the people themselves as being let legitimately.
C. PUBLIC OPINION & THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The aforementioned definition of the national interest
leads again to a recognition of the role of public opinion.
If the policymakers are to map out strategies for the accom-
plishment of certain goals, they must increasingly obtain at
least the tacit approval of the public.
Inevitably, there will be layers of bureaucracy and
interest groups insulating the upper reaches of government
from the people [Ref. 27: pp. 4-5]. It may also be
contended that national strategy will be planned,
20

interpreted, or executed on the basis of one person's or
group's desire to gain or maintain power or prestige
[Eef. 28: pp. 184-185, 188].
Strategic planning and policymaking are definitely
influenced by the personalities of those constituting the
vanguard of the government. This can be a particularly
strong factor in organizations such as the National Security
Council, where the personal styles of the President and his
principal advisors have always dictated the way the NSC has
functioned [Ref. 29].
Yet despite these intervening factors, for decision-
makers to incorrectly perceive or ignore the public mood is
to court disaster. As James Best pats it:
...public opinion serves to define how political
issues are to be resolved and to define in broad terms
the types of issues to be dealt with, the range of
alternatives which are "acceptable", and the range of
criteria to be used for choosing between the alterna-
tives. In addition, public opinion grants legitimacy to
the people who make those decisions and the rules under
which they operate. [ Hef . 30: p. 256]
This statement
#
is supported by more recent findings that
there.
...is a growing body of evidence that rough congru-
ences do exist between public views (as captured in
opinion polls) and the course of national policy,
particularly when trends in the two are compared over
time... [Ref. 31: p. 218]
D. CONCLUSIONS
The answer to the question: "Who determines the
national interest?" is therefore as complicated as the
answer to what the national interest is. The implication
can be drawn that no one directly determines the national
21

interest. Specifics are hard to cone by. The unsatisfying
requirement to make a definition in terms of a "process"
again appears. Intuitively however, one wants to assign
responsibility to someone or something in particular for
deciding what the basis of policymaking action will be.
A synthesis of the "process" definition of the national
interest and Best's statement on the role of public opinion
gives the following answer to the question of who shoulders
the responsibility. The national interest is ultimately
determined by the policymakers' interpretation of the
general moods and needs of the public.
Arguments to the contrary, often based on reasoning such
as, "the president determines the national interest and the
public will follow his lead," are not well supported. It is
probable that the president can influence national moods
[Ref. 32: p. 232], However, a recent survey indicated that
almost two thirds of the public (63%) felt that presidents
were given excessive freedom in determining the nation's
interests [Ref. 33: p. 223].
As was the case with defining the national interest
itself then, the aforementioned synthesis is not a neat and
satisfying concept. The situation created is inherently
unstable. No one is clearly separated from the process.
The assignment of responsibility is fuzzy.
This is, however, the "American way". The decision-
makers take action at their own risk. If they can continu-
ously or finally convince the public that their actions and
policies are in the national interest, then they will be
able to continue in power. Policies which do not gain
public approval will ultimately fail. This concept was once
expressed by Abraham Lincoln in the following way:
No policy that does not rest upon some philosophical
public opinion can be permanently maintained [Rex. 34:
p . 26 5 ]
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On the other hand, if the public does not feel that its
interests are being served, another responsibility must be
fulfilled. The people must responi in such a manner (i.e.,
change their degree of domestic compliance) so as to cause
the decisionmakers tc modify their policies.
It is no longer absolutely necessary, however, to wait
for elections or stage demonstrations in order to express a
desire for change that cannot be ignored. Public opinion
polls provide the various organs of government with a quick
indicator of the public mood on almost any subject. The
government is then faced with the problem of how to respond
to that input.
If public opinion cannot be ignored, the policymakers
must then find some means to gain support for heretofore
unpopular policies. Chapter Three presents a case study
which addresses the second of the three questions posed in
Chapter One. If the correct associated issues are identi-
fied, the possibility for increasing public support for an
historically unpopular policy does exist.
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Ill . INCREASING POBLIC OPINION .SUPPORT—THE.ARMS SALES CASE
The sale of American weapons to foreign countries, a
controversial but integral facet of the strategic policy
embodied in the concept of security assistance, will be the
focal point of this case study. It is the element of
controversy that makes an examination of this case useful,
for it reveals some of the intricacies associated with
gaining public opinion support for unpopular policies.
Summarizing public opinion support for arms sales,
Andrew J. Pierre stated that:
The American public, it should be noted, has been less
than enthusiastic about the high level of U.S. arms
sales achieved in recent years. 7 Public opinion polls
have consistently supported greater restraint. Indeed,
the largest portion of responses to polls taken in the
late 1970s stated fairly routinely that as a general
policy the United States should not sell weapons to
other countries at all. [Ref. 35: p. 71] (footnote
added)
This indicates that, overall, public opinion concerning
arms sales would be at odds with the Reagan Administration's
recently emphasized policy of expanding and strengthening
the security assistance program [Ref. 36: p. 1-15], and
that this aversion has existed for some time. How then can
this, or any, administration increase the generally low
public support for arms sales?
7 This comment is consistent with what some authors char-
acterize as a "merchants of death" syndrome. It appears
that for various historical and sociological reasons, the
American public is uneasy about manufacturing and selling
"war weapons". Some of this may be attributed to the
unpleasant idea that businessmen (arms manufacturers and
dealers) can profit by aiding in the destruction of human
life. See Richard F. Kaufman's The_tfar Profiteers (Garden
City- N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc. J~T9T2Y ancT~Herchants of
Death, A Studv of the Inter nat ional Armament ""Tn5us?ry~15y
"H7C."" "EngeT"5fecsT"ana F.CT Hanigh~en~Ttfew YorF7~'N.Y. : TJodd,




This question can be effectively examined in the
following manner: 1) define a possible hypothesis; 2) iden-
tify a baseline data set; 3) review existing survey data; 4)
list significant events which may have influenced public
thinking; 5) project how those events may have effected the
survey results and; 6) evaluate the proposed hypothesis and
speculate on any policy planning implications that may have
been brought to light.
To begin, the following hypothesis is offered for
consideration:
U.S. public attitudes towards arms sales are directly
related to perceptions concerning the state of East-West
relations; i.e., if tensions with the East (specifically
the USSB) are perceived to be high, support for arms
sales will also be high.
This hypothesis focuses on only one of the strategic
objectives of current security assistance policy
("Establishing opportunities for Onited States influence
abroad and minimizing Soviet and Soviet-surrogate influ-
ence.") [Ref. 37: p. 15], and avoids, for the moment, other
more tenuous arguments related to the "economic benefits" of
arms sales such as increased job opportunities for
Americans. It includes an independent variable (perceptions
of tensions) on which the public has received information as
the result of regular media coverage. Opinions on the
subject are therefore likely to have been formed by most
people, making meaningful surveys possible. The dependent
variable (support for arms sales) has also received regular
media attention, and while the ramifications of arms sales
are complex, the concept itself seems simple to grasp. It




In order to test the hypothesis, a direct measure of
public attitudes toward arms sales is necessary. The Roper
Organization, Inc., has asked the following question in
1975, 1976, 1978, 19 80 and 1981:
The United States has been selling arms and weapons to a
number of countries in various parts of the world. Some
people say this is a mistake because it encourages other
nations to make war. Others say these nations can and
will buy arms from someone else if we don*t sell them,
and if we are their source of arms supplies we have more
control over what they get and how they are used. How
do you feel that as a g enera l policy the United States
should or should not seIT~ arms and weapons to other
nations? [Ref. 38] (emphasis addsd)
Respondents answered affirmatively, negatively, expressed no
opinion, or volunteered a qualified approval ("It depends on
to whom sold.") .
The data set this survey series provided was used to
construct the baseline of comparison in this paper because:
1) the same question was asked by the same organization over
a period of years; 2) the temporal domain covered several
changes in administration and; 3) it was consistent with the
hypothesis. It should also be noted that the starting date
of 1975 comes just after the start of serious Congressional
efforts to gain some measure of control over the arms sale
process [Ref. 39: pp. 9-10], raising both media attention
and public awareness of the situation.
We now turn to a consideration of the survey data.
B. PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY DATA
This section is divided into three major sections of
public opinion survey data which relate to the stated
hypothesis. A discussion of the possible impact in each
instance, along with an explanation of methodology where
necessary, accompanies the quoted survey data. (Frequency




1 . Arm s S a les D ata—
D
e pendent Variable
The baseline data for public opinion on arms sales was
obtained, as previously noted, by the Roper Organization.
In response to the above quoted question, data was recorded
annually as follows (all data in percentages) :
1981 1980 1978 1976 1975
U.S. SHOULD SELL ARMS 37 40 28 28 32
U.S. SHOULD NOT SELL ARMS 35 35 48 45 50
IT DEFENDS ON TO WHOM SOLD 21 20 17 18 13
DON»T KNOW 5 5 7 8 6
During the same survey series, the following question was
also asked with the noted percentage of responses:
You may have differing opinions about selling arms and
weapons to certain specific countries. Here is a list
of some different count ries. ... Would you go down the
list and for each one tell me whether you think the
United States should or should not sell them arms?
(data listed below is for 1981)
SHOULD SHOULD NOT MIXED FEELINGS DON'T KNOW
A. England 6 8 22 4 6




B. Egypt 39 40 12 9
E. Japan 38 46 7 9
C. China 25 56 10 10
G. Saudi Arabia 22 58 9 11
J. Argentina 20 56 9 16
H. South Africa 20 57 10 13
F. Pakistan 18 58 9 15
I. El Salvador 15 63 9 13
— Data in preceding years referring to support for sales
sales to specific countries (SHOULD sell to) is as follows:
1980 1978 1976 1975
A. England 70 56 58 52
K. West Germany 52 38 37 37
D. Israel 49 36 37 38
B. Egypt 45 24 * *
E. Japan 44 29 30 31
C. China * * * *
B. Saudi Arabia 27 19 17 *
J. Argentina * * * *
H. South Africa * * * *
F. Pakistan 26 * * *
I. El Salvador * * * *
(* = question not asked)
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2 . State of Ea st-West Relations--Independent Variable
To test the hypothesis, the arms sales opinion data
must be compared with a measure of public opinion related to
the rest of the hypothesis. In determining whether those
surveyed perceived "tensions with the East" to be high
during the baseline years, their responses to the following
question was considered.
You will notice the (10) boxes go from the highest posi-
tion of "plus 5" for a country which you like very much
(or you have a very favorable opinion of)" ^o (all the
way down to) a position of (the lowest position of)
"minus 5" for a country you dislike very much (have a
very disfavorable opinion of).~ "How far up the scale or
how far down the scale would you rate the following
countries? Russia (or the Soviet Onion)... [Ref. U0:
p. 180]
Osing data taken early in 1982 and 1979 respectively and
attributing it to the preceding' (unsurveyed) years, the
following opinion table reflecting the American public's
opinion of the USSR for the baseline years was compiled (all
data in percentages) :
1981 1980 1978 1976 1975
FAVORABLE 7.3 4 13.5 8 18.7
MIXED 31.5 23 37.6 33.9 45.2
UNFAVORABLE 61 73 48.9 58.1 36.1
3 . Altern ativ e Independent Variables
As previously noted, the American public's access to
information and the impact of that information on opinion is
considerable. Therefore, restricting the consideration of
the test hypothesis' dependent variable to correlation with
a single independent variable would be foolish. There are
too many other factors that may have influenced the public's
opinion [Ref. 41: p. 75], It would, however, be imprac-
tical to consider every possible variable (either indepen-
dent or intervening) that might impinge on the public
attitude regarding arms sales. Oaly a sampling of those




Many polling organizations list arms related
survey data under the heading of defense or military issues-
Assuming that the public might categorize arms sales in the
same manner, it is prudent to examine public opinion data
referring to some general defense/military issues and
compare it with the baseline data. Two data sets in those
areas follow.
a. The following guestion was asked during the
baseline years:
I would like to get your opinion on several areas of
important go vernment activities. As I read each one,
please tell me If you would like the government to do
more, do less, or do about the same as they have been
on. ... defense. [Ref. 42: p. 32] (All data in percent-
ages as interpreted from graphs.)
1981 1980 1978 1976 1975
SHOULD DO MORE 6 1 71 U7 47 32
SHOULD DO LESS 12 9 16 15 23
DO THE SAME 25 19 35 37 40
b. The following guestion was asked during
1980, 1979, 1978, and 1976. (Data listed for 1981 and 1975
is based on graphed trends apparent from available data.
Data listed is for baseline years only and is in percent-
ages. )
:
In general do you feel that the military defense system
of the United States is stronger than that of the
Russians, weaker, or about as strong as the Russian
military defense system? [Ref. 43: p. 129]
1 981 1980 1978 1976 1975
STRONGER 17 15 14 21 33
WEAKER 42 41 40 27 33
ABOUT AS STRONG 39 38 42 47 40
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b. Foreign Affairs Issue
Another area which might pertain to public
support for arms sales to other countries is general concern
over such things as "foreign affairs" or "the economy." In
the first case, the public may sea arms sales as an issue
related to foreign affairs because of the buyers involved.
Economic concerns, on the other hand, may be only obliguely
tied to arms sales opinion, but cannot be discounted as a
factor in any issue confronting Americans.
The following question was asked during the
baseline years. (Data is listed by percentages and is quoted
for two categories only.):
What do you think is the most important problem facing
the country today? [Ref. 44]
1981 1980 1978 1976 1975
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 7 52 9 5 5
ECONOMY 65 43 57 70 80
c. Concern over War/Less Peace Issue
The public's concern over the possibility of war
or the unlikeliness of peace might also be related to the
willingness to sell arms overseas. Such sales could be seen
as "adding fuel to the fire" or as a means of increasing
American security or they may not impact at all.
The various surveys on expectations of violent
discord tend to be more indicative of the general mood
rather zhan positions on more specific situations. Concern
over war is the kind of subject more often considered by a
respondent only when questioned directly about it.
Responses to such a question therefore tend to reflect the
general perception cr mood concerning the world situation.
James Best contends that such a mood can crystalize into
positions on specific issues [Ref. 45: pp. 160-161].
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Logically, a measurement of mood ma/ then be of use in esti-
mating public opinion on a specific issue.
To obtain a "public mood" data set for. the base-
line years, the information from three survey questions has
been merged. Percentages listed ace either as noted in the
source or as interpreted from graphs. Categories such as
"VERY LIKELY" and "SOMEWHAT LIKELSf" are combined. When
monthly surveys were taken during a given year, the data for
the last month the survey was conducted is listed. When
graphed on a frequency polygon (se = Figure 3.4), all data
will be merged on one line. Overlapping data points will be
averaged:
a. Do you think there is a likelihood of a foreign
country, such as Russia, attacking the United States in





b. How likely is it that the United States will become
involved in a war during the next three years?
[Ref. 47: p. 21]
1980 1978
WAR LIKELY 85 44
NOT LIKELY AT ALL 16 56
c. Which of these do you think is likely to be true of
19 ? [Ref. 48: p. 127]
1980 1978 1975
PEACEFUL 14 35 29
TROUBLED 80 45 61
NO OPINION 6 20 10
(NOTE: No opinion surveys regarding the war issue in
general were found for 1976, perhaps because the presiden-
tial election was the major issue of the time.)
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C. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS CHRONOLOGY
There is a great deal of evidence to indicate that
public opinion remains fairly consistent over long periods
of time [Ref. 49: pp. 253-259]. However, the public's
opinion can be altered by events of such significance that
the public takes note of them [Ref. 50]. Events related to
the statistical data in Chapter Three which may have had an
impact on attitudes toward arms sales and/or the various
independent variables suggested in this paper are listed by
year below.
1974
June 14-16 Nelson Amendment is offered in the
House, placing restrictions on arms













51.9 billion dollar budget deficit
projected for fiscal 1976.
Kissenger suspends shuttle diplomacy
between Israel and Egypt.
President Ford says Vietnam setback




White House says President Ford did
not meet Aleksander Solzhenitsyn on
grounds it would endanger "detente".
APOLLO and SOIUZ spacecraft take off
for first U.S. -Soviet space link-up.
President Ford signs Helsinki Charter.
OPEC raises oil prices 10% as of Oct. 1
President Ford dismisses Secretary of
Defense Schesinger, names Rumsfeld
to post.
President Ford meets with Chinese
leaders in Beijing.
1976
January 1 President Ford suggests campaign
themes of peace through strength,


























ff aid to pro-Western
Angolan civil war.
R agree on a treaty limiting
underground nuclear tests
purposes.
rd says it would be
le" to terminate Panama
ations.















President Carter offers plan for
agreement with the Soviet Union on
a ceiling for strategic weapons.
President Carter announces new arms
sales policy.
President Carter announces his
opposition to production of the B-1
strategic bomber.
U.S. and Panama reach basic agreement
on a new canal treaty.
President Carter states that the U.S.
will cut atomic weapons by 50% if the






Decline of dollar halted temporarily.
Soviet nuclear powered spy satellite
breaks up over Canada.
Civil war begins in Nicaragua.






Israelis invade Lebanon to attack
Palestinian guerillas.
Consumer prices up, especially for
food.
Record trade deficit announced.















After intense lobbying by the President,
the Senate approves the Middle East
warplane sale.
President Carter, in a speech at
Annapolis, warns Soviets to end
confrontations with the U.S.
Carter Administration cancels sale
of sixty F-t aircraft to Taiwan.
Consumer prices rising at an 11.4% rate.
President Carter vetos 36 billion
dollar weapons bill.
Mideast summit at Camp David produces peace
accords.
Stock market has worst week in history.
Massive anti-government demonstrations
continue in Iran.
U.S. formally recognizes the PRC.
recognition of Taiwan to be withdrawn.
OPEC announces 14. 5% oil price increase.













The Shah leaves Iran.
-Ayatollah Khomeini is authorized to
return from exile in France to Iran.
-a. S. orders evacuation of American
dependents and non-essential personnel
from Iran.
U.S. reports that Soviets are testing
a long range cruise missile fired
from the Backfire bomber.
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph
Dubs is killed by Afghan Moslem rebels.
U.S. sends arms and military aid to North
Yemen to aid that country in border
fighting with South Yemen.
C.P.I, up 1.2% in February.
Egypt and Israel sign a formal peace
treaty.
President Carter launches effort to
have SALT II ratified.
President Carter approves the development
of a new mobile ICBM.









-President Carter announces "racetrack"
basing mode for the MX.
-President Carter warns USSR about
adverse effacts on relations because
of Soviet troops in Cuba.
President Carter asks for increased
military spending.
U.S. Embassy seized in Tehran.
Saudi Arabia. Venezuela, United Arab
Emirates, and Qatar raise their oil
prices by 33%.


















Soviets denounce U.S T actions in wake
of Afghanistan invasion.
U.S. approves arms sales to Taiwan.
FX aircraft production approved by
President Carter as being in the
national interest.
U.S, offers economic and militar
assistance to Pakistan in wake o
Soviet Afghan invasion. Offer is
rejected on January 17 on grounds
that a largsr amount of aid was
needed than was offered.
UN General Assembly condemns USSR for
Afghan invasion.
President Carter, in State of the Union
message, says U.S. will go to war to
protect Persian Gulf oil supply routes.
Labor Department reports that consumer
prices rose 13.3% in 1979, the largest
annual increase in thirty-three years.
Defense budget is increased.
President Carter says U.S. cannot defend
Persian Gulf unilaterally.
Six US diplomats return to U.S. after
escaping from Iran with Canadian help.
Presidential campaigning in full swing.
Soviets ignore President Carter's
demand that they leave Afghanistan.
President Carter admits that inflation
has "reached a crisis stage."
President Carter hints shift in
SALT II policy.
U.S. cuts diplomatic relations with Iran,




















U.S. attempt to rescue Iranian hostages
fails. Eight military personnel killed.
Previously announced MX basing
mode changed.
OPEC raises crude oil prices.
President Carter approves a peacetime
draft registration funding bill.
Commerce Department reports drop in
leading economic indicators.
President Carter sends weapons to
Thailand after Vietnamese attack.
68 senators indicate opposition to
plan to sell advanced F-15 equipment
to Saudi Arabia.
Reagan nominated by Republicans as
presidential candidate.
U.S. announces a new strategy for nuclear
war based on "counter force" rather than
"countervalue" targeting.
President Carter nominated by Democrats
to run for a second term.
Defense reinterated by presidential
candidates as a major issue.
Iran-Iraq conflict flares into open
war fare.
Televised Reagan-Carter debate. Peace
and economy among major topics.
Reagan elected president. Republicans
to gain control of the Senate.
By a 73 to 1 vote the Senate passes the
largest ($151 billion) peace or wartime
defense money bill.
0, S . suspends new economic and military
aid to El Salvador after four Americans
are killed there.




-President Carter sends 5 billion dollars
in combat equipment to El Salvador as
leftist revolutionaries appear to be
receiving outside aid.
-In final State of the Onion message^
President Carter says U.S. faces serious
problems, deplores Soviet threat to
Poland, and defends SALT II treaty.
-Ronald Reagan becomes president.













President Raagan proposes budget cuts
in all areas except for defense.
State Department declares it will
expand military assistance to El Salvador
President Reagan is shot and wounded.
President Raagan announces new arms
sale policy.
President Reagan decides to go ahead
with full production of neutron weapons.
U, S . Navy jets shoot down attacking
Libyan aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra.
Defense Secretary Weinberger outlines
a three-year, 13 billion dollar defense
budget cut.
-On employment rises to 7.5%.
-President Reagan rejects the mobile
MX basing plan.
President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt is
assassinated.
Martial law is declared in Poland.
(Except where noted by an *, all above items were excerpted and
adapted from the Chronology section of the Gallup Poll for the
applicable year, published by Scholarly Resources Inc. of
of Wilmington, Delaware. All other items were adapted from
general news sources.)
D. DATA INTERPRETATION
As noted in a previous public opinion versus policy
study [Ref. 51: pp. 146-149], the analysis of data such as
that presented in section B has usually been limited to
"short term " or "spot" studies related to specific events.
This creates a relative paucity of baseline data points,
making it impractical to apply some of the more powerful
tools of statistical analysis. The use of the frequency
polygon, however, does make it possible to detect possible
trends.
Frequency polygon graphs displaying portions of the
preceding survey data sets are therefore presented with
their applicable sections as Figures 3.1 through 3.4.
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(Years enclosed by brackets are shown only for time line
continuity purposes and no data points are indicated for
them.) While not necessarily useful from the purely
predictive sense, they can give clues to what may influence
the public to view a specific issue either favorably or
unfavorably.
For example, an examination of Figure 3. 1 should reveal
if the previously stated hypothesis is generally true; i.e.,
whether the trend line reflecting unfavorable public opinion
toward Russia is similar in slope to the trend line relating
to arms sales approval. Additionally, by checking the
graphs, it should be apparent if some other factor (s) might
be useful in gauging public support for arms sales.
1 . Arm s S a les O pinion vs asSR/rension Perception
It is readily visible upon examination of Figure 3.1
that prior to 1976 there was no positive correlation between
public support for arms sales in general and attitudes
toward the Soviet Onion. After 1978, however, a positive
correlation appears to occur. How may events have effected
the trend lines?
a. Public Support for Arms Sales
The chronology presented earlier indicates that
the Nelson Amendment concerning U.S. arms sales and human
rights was offered in 197a. This was the subject of exten-
sive media coverage and public attention at that time.
Starting with this initial negative input, public support
for arms sales declined (according to Figure 3.1) during the
period 1975 through 1978. Additionally, in the early part
(1975-1976) of that period, presidential hopeful, and later
Democratic presidential nominee Jimmy Carter made an issue
of the morality of U.S. arms sales [ Ref . 52: p. 125].




































Figure 3.1 Sales Support/USSR Opinion Graph.
unilateral restraint in arms sales based largely on human
rights considerations was firmly stated in 1977 [Ref. 53:
p. 11]. Public support for arms sales rose, however,
through 1980 as the Carter Administration tied arms sales to
the peace process in the Middle East and as arms were sent
to North Yemen to ccntrol border fighting. Additionally,
arms were sent to Thailand in 1980 after a Vietnamese attack
on that country. The subject of human rights was not
strongly pursued during these sales despite the authori-
tarian regimes often involved.
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Arms sales to El Salvador did become a subject
of controversy towards the end of the Carter Presidency,
with human rights considerations conflicting with fears of a
Communist takeover. How consistently the Carter arms policy
was being applied became the subject of heated discussion.
President Reagan then came into office in 1981.
Soon after, a change in arms sales policy was announced. It
was deemed necessary that such sales be based largely on the
precepts of aid to allies and strengthening of security
relationships [Ref. 54: p. 15]. While this stated policy
was not popular with human rights activists, it was more
reflective of the policy that the Carter Administration had
actually found it necessary in the past to use.
The high visibility of arms sales policy between
1975 and 1981 is attested to by the freguency with which it
was mentioned in Presidential policy statements. However,
the change in opinion over the tims period cannot be wholly
attributed to policy pronouncements, since, as noted, the
D.S. government's actions did not always match its rhetoric.
b. Attitudes toward Russia
Looking for incidents related to the Soviet
"unfavorable" rating line, it can be seen that in 1975 (as
shown by the joint American /Soviet space mission) , "detente"
was in full bloom and approval of the Soviets was relatively
high.
With 1976 came the conflict in Angola. When a
Soviet-backed faction took control while the U.S. cut off
aid to the pro-Western forces, public opinion was
influenced.
Although a Soviet nuclear powered spy satellite
fell on Canada in 1978 and the Carter Administration was
talking about Soviet confrontation problems, the Mideast had
now become the center of concern. That area continued to
40

dominate public concern during 1979. At the end of that
year, however, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
That acticn explains ths largely negative reac-
tion to Russia during 1980. This was reinforced by the many
policy decisions (such as the Olympic boycott) that were
made because of the invasion.
By 1981, the election of a more conservative and
outspokenly anti-Soviet president could also have affected
overall opinion about Russia, kseping disapproval high.
Soviet actions in Poland at the tims were also well noted by
the public. However, concern shifted away from the Soviets
and toward Central America by the end of the year due to the
upheavals occurring in that area.
The above historical overview is by no means
exhaustive. Other factors certainly must have influenced
public opinion on the USSR during this period. Obviously
though, it is easy to see a number of reasons why opinion
fluctuated as it did during the baseline years.
c. Interpretation
Relating the preceding to the proposed
hypothesis, one can see that a consistent correlation of the
dependent and independent variables does not occur nor does
it appear that any easily discernable factors skewed what
would otherwise have been consistent trends. The degree to
which the public perceives a high level of tension with the
East is apparently not a reliable indicator of public
opinion on arms sales.
To recast the original hypothesis into something
useful, it is now necessary to examine the other possible
independent variables suggested earlier to see if a common
thread can be found.
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2. Defense/Mi litary Is sues as I ndicators
Questions concerning arms sales are usually found in
those sections of public opinion surveys dealing with
defense or military matters. One might assume that a func-
tional variant of the originally stated arms sales support
hypothesis might be found in those areas, i.e., support for
arms sales might increase when it is felt that the
government should do more for defense or if the U.S. is
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Figure 3.2 Sales Support/More Defense/OS Weakness Graph.
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a. Perception of U.S. Military Weakness
Beginning with military force perception, it can
be seen in Figure 3.2 that prior to 1978 the correlation
between support for arms sales and the public perception
that the U.S. as militarily weaker than the USSR was, if
anything, negative. After 1978, while the two trends begin
to move in similar directions, the degree of change is much
more pronounced in the arms sales trend line between 1978
and 1980.
Significantly, the perception of U.S. weakness
does not match the perception that more should be done about
defense (see next topic). However, perceptions of U.S.
military weakness do not seem to serve as a good indicator
of public arms sales support.
b. Government Should Do More About Defense
Aside from a sharp divergence from 1975 to 1976,
the trend lines in Figure 3.2 for arms sales support and
support for increased government efforts on defense display
roughly similar slopes. The reason for the divergence can
te readily explained.
During the 1976 presidential race, President
Ford had made strengthening national defense an issue,
possibly leading to a higher level Df public concern in that
area. During his campaign and after his election. President
Carter specifically emphasized the issue of arms sales as a
negative component of U.S. policy. Conflicting signals were
being sent to the public.
The crisis in Iran and the Afghanistan invasion,
plus the raising of issues attendant with the 1980 presi-
dental campaign) probably served as the impetus for the rise
in concern over defense efforts. Arms sales support also
rose during this period.
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Ronald Reagan* s subsequent election to president
with a commitment to increase defense spending then allowed
public attention to move on to other areas. Interest in
defense spending increases thereafter declined as the
problem was perceived to be "taken care of." As can be
seen, arms sales support also startsd to decline in 1981.
c. Interpretation
Public concern over defense efforts appears to
be a good indicator of public support for arms sales. A
"lumping together" of some defense issues in the public mind
apparently does occur, implicitly strengthening support for
arms sales if concern over the lsvel of defense efforts
rises in general. To determine why the desire to see
greater emphasis on defense does not match the perception of
D.S. military weakness is beyond the scope of this paper.
In any event, support for the government to do
more on defense is net necessarily the only or best indi-
cator of arms sales support. The remaining variables must
still be examined to determine if they also have value as
indicators.
3 . "National Problems" as Indicators
Surveys measuring concern about foreign affairs or
the economy offer another useful means to measure the "mood"
of the public (see subsubsection III-B-3c) . Public percep-
tions on these very general topics should be examined to see
if they can serve as indicators to opinion on the narrower
subject of arms sales.
a. Foreign Affairs Concerns
Despite such happenings in 1975 as the Mayaguez
incident or the 1975-1976 Angolan civil war, public concern
for foreign affairs remained extremely low until the twin
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shocks of Iran and Afghanistan. Foreign affairs concern
peaked in 1980 and then fell to its "normal" (and far lower)
level in 1981. (See Figure 3.3 below.)
While both U.S. presidential campaigns during
the data base period raised issues relating to foreign
affairs, it appears that only discrete events outside the
country were able to pique the publics concern. This
difficulty in arousing U.S. public interest in foreign
affairs without some sort of watershed event has been noted
in the past by writers such as William Kintner; as well as
the tendency for opinion to gyrate rapidly once it is set in
motion [Ref. 55: p. 142]. However, while support for arms
sales also peaked in 1980, the degree of change is quite
different. Additionally, support for arms sales was never
nearly as low (or as high) as concern over foreign affairs.
b. Economic Concerns
Economic bad news of some sort or another
(C.P.I, up, unemployment up, etc.) appears throughout the
aforelisted chronology. Interestingly though, the slope of
the economic concern line is generally the reverse of the
foreign affairs concern trend line. Notably, only in 1980
did concern over the economy drop below concern over foreign
affairs.
Economic concern can be seen as, at best,
inversely correlated to arms sales support. If this is
true, linking arms sales policy to support of the O.S.
economy, would not appear to be a good way to gain public
support. Efforts to garner backing for U.S. arms sales by
arguing that they create jobs and bolster industrial output
appear to be a waste of time.
In terms testing the hypothesis then, no depen-
dable relationship can be directly discerned. As Figure 3.3
shows, the divergences are large between the two trend lines
and they do not slope in a similar lanner.
U5

1975 1976 [1977] 1978 [\979} 1980 1981
YEAR
Figure 3.3 Sales Support /Foreign-Economic Concern Graph.
c. Interpretation
Although they are easily and often measured,
concerns about foreign affairs and the economy do not
provide a bellwether by which the degree of support for arms
sales can be predicted. While significant changes have
occurred in public opinion on the arms sale question, it in
no way approaches the rollercoaster ride that changes in the
two more general public concerns have taken. Given the
kinds of problems that occurred during the baseline years,
it is questionable whether the arms sale issue is effected
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by the kind of emotionally charged, "problem of the moment"
type of sentiment that questions about the economy or
foreign affairs might evoke.
4. War/La s s . Pea ce
^
Iss u e as an .Indicator
As Figure 3.4 indicates, a decline occurred from
1975 through 1978 in American worries over the prospects for
a peaceful world. In 1975, the Vietnam conflict was over
and "detente" with the USSR was strongly supported. The
Helsinki Charter was signed. The year of the American
Bicentennial brought another treaty with the Soviets and the
optimism generated by a year long anniversary celebration.
In 1977, President Carter continually sounded the themes of
peace and morality throughout the nation. 1978 marked the
signing of the Camp David peace accords by Egypt, Israel,
and the U.S., plus the official recognition of the Peopled
Republic of China. These events overshadowed many others
that may have raised concerns, such as the fighting in
Nicaragua and Ethiopia/Somalia.
The uproar in Iran and the murder of the O.S. ambas-
sador to Afghanistan in early 1979 probably influenced the
decline in the majority sentiment that war was not likely
and that the world would be peaceful. Subsequently, the
fall of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the "discovery" of
Soviet troops in Cuba, the U.S. embassy seizure in Iran, and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan explain the real turn-
about of opinion. 1980 was merely a continuation of 1979 in
terms of confrontation and conflict.
Then, in 1981, emphasis on the defense issue by
President Reagan contributed to the creation of a feeling
that the O.S. was back in control of its own destiny. This
was, no doubt, aided by the euphoria and relief created by
the release of the American hostages in Iran. The O.S.
downing of two Libyan jets could only reinforce the general
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Figure 3.4 Sales Support/War or Less Peace Graph.
a. Interpretation
As was the case when sampling opinion on whether
the government should do more about defense, the trend line
in Figure 3.4 representing concerns over war and peace tends
to slope in a manner similar to the arms sales support line.
Without a data point for 1976, it cannot be positively
determined if the slope for the period 1976 through 1978
would have flattened out. The events of that time period




It should be noted that the steep drop in
concern about war in 1981 was not matched by as steep a drop
(a staticticaliy significant, but small, 3 percent) in the
arms sale support trend. This is possibly due to President
Reagan's announcement of a changed arms sales policy,
casting such transactions in a mora positive light than
previously. This situation may then be seen as a reverse of
the situation in 1975, when mostly aegative statements about
arms sales may have skewed the support trend in a downward
direction. It is obvious, however, that any hypothesis
projecting whan or how public support for arms sales can be
increased should include some facet of the war/less peace
issue.
E. COHCLOSIOHS
Two specific guestions (among others) remain to be
answered from the preceeding discussion. They are:
1) Can a means cf increasing public support for an
unpopular policy be found?
2) Was the hypothesis on arms sales support true?
Talcing the latter guestion first, let us consider the
answers.
1 • Evaluat ing t he
.
Hypothesi s
It was evident after examining the available data
that the hypothesis relating public support of arms sales to
the perception of East-West tension was not supported by the
evidence. The trends of opinion for the two variables are
not similar enough to prove the hypothesis true.
Alternatively though, the trends of opinion reflecting
desires to see more efforts made Da defense and levels of
concern over the possibility of war appeared to mirror the
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trend of arms sales support after other influences were
accounted for.
The desire to have the government do more on defense
is logically tied to the concern that war or unrest is
likely. Accepting this combination of two factors, a new
hypothesis pertaining to arms sale support can be stated
thusly:
U.S. public attitudes towards arms sales are directly
related to concerns about the iacreased likelihood of
war and the need for defense. When support for defense
efforts rises, so does support for arms sales.
The limited amount of baseline data and the reguirement for
several assumptions to be made would make classifying the
above statement as more than a hypothesis guestionable.
This, as previously noted, is a problem that often occurs
when dealing with "old" public opinion data. The new
hypothesis does, however, both fit the available data and
lend itself to logical acceptance.
To gaickly test the revised hypothesis, we must
shift the focus of this discussion somewhat. Consider the
survey data in Chapter 3 regarding arms sales to foreign
countries. It shows that only aris sales to England were
supported by over 50 percent of chose surveyed n o mat ter
what the general level of support for arms sales was.
Since at least World War I, most Americans have
considered England as a loyal friend and ally, a country
whose continued existence was important to our own way of
life. It is logical to assume that this attitude influenced
support for arms sales to England. In fact, the support for
arms sales in general peaked the same year that arms sales
support for England peaked; i.e., 1980.
By implication, selling arms may then be more accep-
table to the public when such sales are seen as a means to
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provide those countries considered to be important and
sympathetic with O.S. interests with a means to better
protect thenselves in troubled times- By strengthening
friends and allies, stability can then be found in the midst
of turmoil and the risk of war decraased.
It is also noteworthy that the support for arms
sales to most of the countries listed in subsection B-1
peaked in the maximum crisis year of 1980. Could it be that
the definition of "friends and allies" becomes somewhat less
well defined when war is involved? In any event, this only
tends to support the efficacy of the reformulated hypothesis
as a barometer of public support for arms sales. The
conclusion can also be drawn that if the desire for
increased emphasis en national security is strongly mani-
fested by the public, those issues they may consider related
to achieving that end, such as arms sales, will also receive
greater support.
2. Increa sing Public
.
Opinion Sup port fo r Unp o pula r
Polici es
The direct answer tc the question of whether public
opinion support can be increased in cases such as" the one
above appears to be "yes". However, one can better evaluate
the consequences of attempting to obtain public opinion
support for unpopular polices after considering the case set
forth in the next chapter. That case includes characteris-
tics of importance and complexity that, rightly or wrongly,
are not normally associated with arms sales. Additionally,




IV. PRESENTING A COMPLEX POLICY^-THE_gX,HISSILE CASE
If one wishes to consider a strategic policy case with
intricate underpinnings, the advent of atomic weaponry
created a perfect opportunity. Thsre can be no doubt that
the content of American nuclear strategy is complex. A
public opinion poll conducted in May 1982 revealed that only
35 percent of those surveyed thought that the public could
understand just the issues involved in the concept of a
joint 0. S. /Soviet nuclear weapons "freeze" [Ref. 56], which
is but a single factor in the current overall strategy plan-
ning eguaticn.
Paradoxically, this recognized complexity does not
necessarily mean that the public will not form strong opin-
ions about nuclear strategy. 8 Quoting Edward L. Bernays,
"...the fact [is] that persons who have little knowledge of
a subject almost invariably form definite and positive
judgements upon the subject." [Ref. 57: p. 63]
Since there is a fairly large amount of media attention
being paid to nuclear issues, this means that the public
will almost inevitably have an opinion on nuclear strategy.
This rather difficult situation creates distinct difficul-
ties for policymakers. They cannot expect the complexity of
the subject or the strategic nature of nuclear weaponry to
serve as a shield from the influence of public opinion
[Ref. 58: p. 243 ]. Further, as has been established,
public opinion cannot long be ignored by those in power.
8 This also raises a question as to whether the public
might view national security related issues differently than
issues with a purely domestic content. A consideration of
this can be found in Edward J. Laurance*s "The Changing Role
of Congress in Defense Pol icy-Making ," Journal of Con flict




For some, the idea of public imput to strategic planning
may seem to be a new concept. For example, the following
item was contained in a recent newspaper story about univer-
sity commencement speakers:
Dan Rather, anchor and managing editor of the CBS
Evening News, told graduates at Boston University that
nuclear-weapons control no longer is the province of
heads of state and strategic planners but has become a
grass-roots concern. [Ref. 59: p. 5L]
The importance and impact of public opinion on the stra-
tegic planning process has, however, been recognized by some
strategists for quite some time. The following rather
lengthy guote from Bernard Brodie, while it speaks of war
strategy rather than nuclear strategy jger se, eloguently
describes this point:
The idea persists that strategy can be comprehen-
sible only to people who wear uniforms. let for better
or worse, the layman plays a great part in determining
the military strategy of a nation. In a democracy in
wartime he rightly insists on speaking his mind, and he
probably underestimates the degree to which military and
political leaders respond to his demands. His very
optimism or despondency creates situations which the
authorities cannot afford to ignore. Prior to the
outbreak of war he elects to office politicians whose
policies may either further or hopelessly compromise the
country^ security, or at least greatly affect the price
of victory.
(The above paragraph applied as much to the Vietnam
situation of the 1960s and early 1970s as it does to the
current concern about nuclear warfare.)
I should be loath, however, to leave the impression
that civilian influence upon the determination of
strategy is in any sense regrettable. Clemenceau had
good enough reasons for his famous statement that "War
is too important to be left to the generals." The
greatest generals have themselves expressed that very
opinion. Everyone is familiar with the dictum of
Clausewitz that war is a continuation of politics, but
its implications are not so generally recognized. Yet
we have on the authority of that great philosopher of
war himself just what he meant by it.
"To leave a great military enterprise," he said, "or
the plan for one to a purely military -judgement and
decision is a distinction~nat cannot Ee aTlowed". . . ana*
wh"eiT~ p1o"ple speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial
influence of policy [i.e. politicians] on the conduct of
a war, they say in reality something very different from
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what they intend. It is not this influence but the
policy itself which should be criticized."
(While certainly applicable to nuclear planning
today, Clausewitz has here also manged to highlight
problems relating to U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
Lebanon, and Grenada.)
For a democracy, the corollary of that idea can be
best expressed in the words of Captain Russell Grenfell
of the British Navy: "Though the Government may often
be forced by the exigencies of the case to come to vital
decisions concerning the conduct of the war without
previously taking the public into its confidence. . .it
will be greatly strengthened in making those decisions
if it can feel that it has behind it an instructed
public opinion on strategical matters: a public opinion
which is capable of formina a just and reliable estimate
of the soundness or otherwise of the strategy adopted as
it is seen to develop." [Ref. 60: pp. vii-ix](emphasis and brackets quoted, parenthetical comments
mine.
)
Just a year after Brodie*s comment was made, Edward Mead
Earle echoed the idea that the public is a vital part of the
strategy making process. He tied to this a necessity for
continually attending to the inclusion of the public in that
process as a means for furthering the national interest.
Earle said that:
Strategy. .. is not merely a concept of wartime, but is
an inherent element of statecraft at all times...
[Ref. 61: p. vii]
Then he invoked the name of Walter Lippmann before he
continued his remarks by saying:
The very existence of a nation depends upon its concept
of the national interest and the means by which the
national interest is promoted; therefore it is impera-
tive that the citizens understand the fundamentals of
strategy. ... there is only one safe repository of the
national security
people. [Ref. 62j
cf a democratic state: the whole
How do all the above facts and statements fit together?
Briefly, the issue of nuclear strategy has created a
measurable level of public opinion. It is to the
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policymakers 1 advantage to somehow inform or educate that
opinion in such a manner so as to increase public support.
If this is not done, then a nuclear strategy which the stra-
tegic planners themselves feel to be vital will have to be
changed.
This answers the latter part of the second question at
the end of Chapter One. Even policies considered by the
leadership to be critical to national survival cannot be
exempted from the necessity for public opinion support.
A case wherein an appreciation of this concept has
apparently been incorporated into the handling of a matter
concerning nuclear strategic planning currently exists and
will be discussed later in this chapter. First, however, a
brief overview of the origins of ths case is necessary.
A. THE MX HISSILE— EACKGROUND S POLICIES
The possibility of nuclear war seemed to become a
reality for Americans in 1949. It was in that year that the
Soviet anion detonated its first atomic bomb. Since that
time, the United States has set forth a number of nuclear
strategic plans or doctrines [Ref. 63: pp. 37-71] which
have, for the most part, centared on the concept of
deterrence. 9
*A full exploration of the concept of deterrence is
beyond the scope of this discussion; nor will its past
effectiveness, current usefulness, or philosophical bases be
evaluated. A mere sample of the vast amount of literature
Quart erl y, Spring 1981; Bernard Brodie, "Strategy ~Tn Tfte
HTssiTe~"flqe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univefsity""Press7
T9"59T7 CoTin S. Gray. "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a
Theory of Victory," International Security., Summer 1979; Jan
M. Lodal, "Deterrence aM~"N~ucTear""5£ra1:egy," Daedalus, Fall
1980; Donald H. Snow, "Current Nuclear Deterrence ThTnking:
An Overview and Review," Int ernational Studies Quarterly*
September 1979; Herman Kahn, T7n TITsr m onuclear"^a r , Zna ed.
(Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University" PTess, ~T961); "NSC
68, A Report to the National Security council by the
Executive Secretary on U.S. Objectives and Programs for
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In this section, the following items related to nuclear
strategic planning will be covered:




2)Discus g the centerpiece of that strategy; the
3) Describing the history of a proposed new "leg" for
the Triad; the MX (Missile Expeniental or
"Peacekeeper") missile; and also seeing how the
rationale for building the MX in relationship to current
deterrence strategy has changed.
The section following this will deal with the impac-1- and
importance of public opinion in the more recent iterations
of the portion of the planning process that item #3
represents.
1 . What is the current nuclear strategic policy?
In his fiscal year 1983 report to the Congress,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger characterized
America's nuclear deterrence policy in the following manner:
The United States will maintain a strategic nuclear
force posture such that, in a crisis, the Soviets will
have no incentive to initiate a nuclear attack on the
United States or cur allies. U.S. forces will be
capable under all conditions of war initiation to
survive a Soviet first strike and retaliate in a way
that permits the United States to achieve its objec-
tives.... our goal will be to gain and maintain a nuclear
deterrent force which provides us an adeguate margin of
safety with emphasis on eniurin£ survivabil ity*t n a rir
[Ref. 64: p7HFT7y^empa"asIs""aa'aiaj
It Deter Aggression?." New Republic, March 29, 1945; and
Glenn H. Snyder, ";Defeffence, T5y Denial and Punishment,"
Center of International Studies, Princeton University,
January 2, 1959; and Alexander L. Seorge and Richard Smoke,
Deterrence in. American Foreign Polioy: Theory and Practice
7Hew 7o rTc7~TITY7~~Co I umT5ia~u"niversify PressT'TT/Trp"
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Secretary Weinberger restated the deterrence policy
with a slightly different emphasis 10 months later. At that
time he said:
Today, deterrence remains, as it has for the past 37
years, the cornerstone of our strategic nuclear policy
and, indeed, our entire national security posture. Our
strategy is a defensive one, designed to prevent attack,
?articularly nuclear attack, against us or our allies.
o deter successfully, we must Be able, and^must be seen
to be abl e, to retaliate against any potenxial aggressor
m"*sucn a manner that the costs we exact will substan-
tially exceed any gains he might hope to achieve by
aggression. [ Ref . 65: p. 3] (emphasis added)
The basic policy for deterrence expressed by
Secretary Weinberger remained consistent. However, the
reason for shifting the emphasis somewhat away from the
survivability of the nuclear deterrent and toward empha-
sizing its perceptual impact on an aggressor will be
explored later in this discussion.
2 . !hat_is_the_"nuclear .Triad"
?
When discussing how the U.S. theory of nuclear
deterrence is implemented, the phrase "nuclear Triad" or
just "Triad" often appears in the conversation. What is the
Triad? What concepts and systems does it include?
By the 1960's, the U.S. had deployed three systems
to deliver nuclear warheads to long distance targets. These
were and still are: 1) land-based manned bombers; 2) U.S.
based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ; and 3)
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
.
It was the
addition of the SLBM capability that gave impetus to the
formal articulation of the Triad concept in the late 1960's
[Eef. 66: pp. U 8, 87].
Since that tine, each of the three types of weapons
systems has been generically referred to as a "leg", no
matter what specific type of system was actually being used.
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Thus the earlier Pclaris/Posideon submarine systems are
being replaced by the Trident and the B-52 bomber is being
supplanted by the B- 1 as legs of the Triad.
It has been contended that the creation of the Triad
was not due as much to the execution of a specific strategic
plan as it was to the happenstance coming together of avail-
able weapons systems technologies [Bef. 67: p. 87], There
may be some truth in this, but nevertheless, the Triad has
so far provided the kind of flexibility, diversity, and
reliability necessary to make the U.S. nuclear deterrent
credible. As Roger Speed notes:
Given the wide range of uncertainties about Soviet and
American weapons systems, especially when evaluated
within the context of a nuclear war, diversified forces
provide a critical hedge against the catastrophic
failure of one or more systems and safeguard the U.S.
deterrent against Soviet technological breakthroughs.
This diversity can also be expected to complicate the
execution of an effective ccunterforce strike because
the Soviets must use different tactics and weapons
systems to attack the full O.S, force. Diversified
forces also complicate the Soviets 1 defense against a
retaliatory strike. For example, ICBMs and SLBMs
reenter the atmosphere at different angles, can come
from a wide variety of directions and employ different
means of overcoming an antiballisxic missile system.
And penetrating bombers armed with bombs and Short-Range
Attack Missiles (SRAM) present the Soviets with an
entirely different set of defense problems. TRef. 68:
p. 19]
Whether initially accidental or intentional, the
Triad concept has endured and will probably continue to do
so. The rationale for its current existence is to a large
degree generated by its past existence. The Triad makes
sense now because it made sense before. It has become, to
use Norman Polmar 1 s word, "holy" [Ref. 69: p. 87].
At least one flaw, however, apparently exists in the
current Triad. It is the nature of that flaw and the
proposed means to repair it that we now turn to.
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3« Why does t he U.S. n eed the MX missile?
In the eyes of many , one leg of the Triad has fallen
behind the other two in terms of survivability in the event
of an unexpected nuclear attack. Simply stated, submarines
and bombers are mobile and therefore relatively hard to find
and/or hit in the event of a preamptive surprise attack-
Logically then, the increased capability of the Soviets to
accurately target the fixed ICBM sites (referred to as
underground launching silos) located in the U.S. has raised
questions about, the efficacy of even maintaining them
[Ref. 70: p. 2],
Modifications of the criteria for when ICBMs would
be used in the event of a Soviat nuclear attack were
proposed to correct the vulnerability problem. The
so-called "launch on warning" or "launch on attack" plans
that were suggested advocated the firing of the missiles
before inbound Soviet ICBMs/SLBMs actually struck the U.S.
This eliminated the possibility that our launching silos
could be destroyed before we could mount a retaliatory
strike [ Ref. 71 ].
Such strategies obviously carry an increased element
of risk. The misinterpretation of some "innocent" Soviet
action, causing it to be construed as either an indication
of an impending attack or an attack itself, could lead to
the unwarranted and undesired unleashing of a destructive
nuclear exchange. 1 *
10 An example how of this problem might arise is found in
the following item taken from "Washington Whispers," U.S.
News and World Report, May 10, 1982. p. 15:
Without warning, the Soviet Union on several occa-
sions has fired salvos of missiles from operational
silos. In each case, American sensors quickly deter-
mined that the warheads were not headed for the U.S.




Since the mid-1960 's the Department of Defense has
recognized the potential problem of ICBM vulnerability. It
has, however, generally sought a means to increase surviv-
ability by altering the weapons system itself [Ref. 72: p.
i] rather than changing the approach to missile launch
policy [Ref. 73: pp. 5-6].
But survivability was not necessarily the key
rationale for deciding to replace the then existing ICBM
force. As was the case for the other two Triad legs,
modernization of the specific system was deemed necessary.
A portion of the ICBM force, the Titan II missile, had been
deployed in 1961. The Minuteman series of iCBMs, although
subsequently updated, was deployed in the early 1970*s
[Ref. 74: p. 94]. It, therefore, was a design product of
the 1960's. Not surprisingly then, the preliminary work on
an evolutionary replacement for the Titan/Minuteman series,
which was to be more powerful and accurate than the
Minuteman, began in 1973 [Ref. 75: pp. 169-170].
By 1979, however, the concept of ICBM survivability
had overshadowed the emphasis on modernization. As then
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown subsequently noted in
1980:
Our most significant force deficiency in the next
few years will be the vulnerability of our fixed silo
ICBM t s.. . .but no sound technical solution was found
until the MX multiple shelter concept was developed and
selected in 1979... .The great effort (and considerable
cost) that we are willing to expend to ensure MX surviv-
ability is evidence that we plan our strategic forces in
a retaliatory role. A survivable system is less threat-
ening than the vulnerable one it replaces. ("Ref. 76:
p. 5] (emphasis quoted)
While other issues relating to force modernization, arms
control, and deterrence were subsequently covered by
Secretary Brown in another portion of the above cited state-
ment [Ref. 77: pp. 6-9], the major focal point for the MX
at that time was clearly on the need for survivability.
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Nuclear strategy had been revised to some extent.
It was not sufficient for the ICBM force to just be powerful
and modern to be an effective part of the deterrent Triad.
It had to be "survivable".
Debate did continue on the need for the MX itself.
However, the major emphasis clearly shifted to determining
how the missile would be deployed (or "based") to ensure its
survivability [Bef. 78].
Under the Carter Administration, as mentioned above
by Secretary Brown, the MX was to be deployed in multiple
protective shelters (MPS) , also called the multiple aim-
point system (MAPS) . Essentially, this system called for
the periodic concealed movement of the missiles to various
possible launch points. This movement was to be accom-
plished in an area so large that the Soviets would have to
expend up to 2 3 nuclear warheads to ensure the actual
destruction of only a single American missile [Bef. 79: p.
91].
Criticism of this method of deployment was intense.
Arguments deriding its economic impact, environmental
impact, actual feasibility, and real effectiveness as a
means to ensure survivability were loudly advanced [Bef. 80:
pp. 126-138].
With the election of fionald Reagan to the presidency
in 1980, the MPS plan was abandoned. Nevertheless though,
the basing mode for the MX, rather than the need for modern-
ization of the ICBM force, continusd to be the major issue
[Bef. 81: p. 46].
The president subseguently decided to implement a
basing plan referred to as "Dense Pack" or closely spaced
basing (CSB) . The Air Force described this approach in the
following manner:
CSB is a permanent, survivable basing mode for the
M-X...It gains its success from a combination of
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superhard capsules housing tks M-X missile in a
cannister-launcher , and close spacing, which prevents
attack en more than a small portion of The force at any
one time. This is due to a phenomenon known as "fratri-
cide" in which early arriving attacking warheads disable
or render ineffective those that arrive later thereby
preventing successful attack [ Bef . 82: p. 1].
The practicality of the CSB approach was strongly
guestioned because of the unusual "fratricide" concept. Its
implementation was halted by congressional action in
December of 1982 [Ref. 83: pp. 5-13].
In response to this. President Reagan formed the
President's Commission on Strategic Forces:
...to review the strategic modernization program of
the United States. In particular ... .to examine the
future of our ICBM forces and to recommend basing alter-
natives. [Ref. 84: cover letter]
The so-called Scowcroft Commission included the
following recommendations concerning ICBMs among its
findings:
a. Engineering design should be initiated, now, of a
single-warhead ICBM weighing about 15 tons; this program
should lead to the initiation of full-scale development
in 1987 and an initial operating capability in the early
1990's. Deploying such a missile in more than one mode
would serve stability. Hardened silos or shelters and
hardened mobile launchers should be investigated now.
b. One hundred MX missiles should be deployed
fromptly in existing Minuteman silos as a replacement
or those 100 Minutemen and the Titan II ICBMs now being
decommissioned and as a modernization of the force.
c. A specific program to resolve the uncertainties
regarding silo or shelter hardness should be undertaken,
leading to later decisions about hardening MX in silos
and deploying a small single-warhead ICBM in hardened
silos or shelters. Vigorous investigation should
Sroceed on different types of land-based vehicles and
aunchers, including hardened vehicles. [Ref. 85: p.
21] L *
It would appear then that the answer to the gues-
tion: "Why does the U.S. need the MX missile?" is no
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different now than it would have been in 1973. The old
must fce replaced with the new.
Is the 'MX really justifiable only as a modernization
of the ICBM leg of the Triad? Is survivability really a
critical issue if the current recommendation is to continue
to use existing "vulnerable" silos for basing? Apparently
time is still available to further investigate problems
related to vulnerability and even come up with yet another
new missile system. If so, why not wait? Obvious arguments
to the effect that it would be cheaper and just as effective
to continue to update the existing Minuteman missile system
while waiting for the new missile [Bef. 86: pp. 11-12] make
sense based on the Scowcroft Commission recommendations.
In fact, this whole situation suddenly seems to be
one of the few "simple" issues of nuclear strategy, offering
an easy and "obviously" correct choice based on cost
effectiveness. ICBM force , modernization requirements can be
met at a later time with the proposed new missile. The
system in place now is practically as good as the MX. Why
waste money on an interim fix?
Yet, four presidents have approved or advocated the
development and production of the MX. This seems ample
proof that a number of strategic planners have advanced a
convincing case to the strategic policymakers that the MX is
vital for the nation's defense and is in the national
interest.
Assuming the situation really is more complex than
it appears, can enough public opinion support to ensure the
continuance of the MX program be maintained? How?
B. THE MX ISSUE 5 PUBLIC OPINION
It is not the purpose of this paper to ultimately judge
the value of the MX missile and/or its basing mode. Rather,
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having identified the issue as one of strategic signifi-
cance, we can now turn to the examination of what public
opinion has been on the MX and related issues. Then the
actions taken by the current administration to win public
approval for the MX missile take on a new significance.
1 . Publis hed Public Opinion Data Relat ed to the MX
This readily available data may be divided into two
types: 1) the measurement of public response to the MX
itself; and 2) public opinion on matters that might be
related to their feelings about the MX. A sampling of both
follows.
a. "Should the U.S. build the MX missile?"
The narrative summary portion of the ABC
News/Washington Post Poll for June 15-19, 1983 contained an
interesting statement. It revealed a change in the answers
to guestions asked of the public that were similar to the
one above:
...public opinion on the development and deployment
of the MX missile has turned around since the beginning
of the year. In January the public opposed building the
MX missile by a 51 -to- 38 majority. In our most recent
Soil, 46 percent now say we should build the missile and
4 percent oppose building it. [Ref. 87: p, 3 ]
The significant shift in opinion from disapproval to
approval seems even more remarkable after examining item A
in the following set of data.
b. Public Opinion on Related Issues
The below listed items [labeled (A) through (C) ]
refer to other areas of public concern related to nuclear
weapons and therefore, by inferrence, could affect MX
support. Because of this, they must be examined as some of
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the factors that keep public opinion in what some consider
to be a normal, but constant state of flux and upheaval
[Ref. 88: p. 75].
Compare the statistical data in the quotation
from the ABC poll above with the response recorded for the
following public opinion survey question. It was also asked
in June 1983 (data listed in percentages):
(A) "Do you favor or oppose the U.S. agreeing to a
nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union--that is, putting a
stop to the testing, production and installation of




The response to a poll conducted in 1982,
however, cast the apparent conflict between the above two
pieces of data in a different light. The question asked
then was (data listed in percentages)
:
(B) "In thinking about the United States* s [sic]
national defense, how important is it to you that the
United states produce as many nuclear weapons as the
Soviet Union does... very important, somewhat important,




It appears that while many Americans favor a
"nuclear freeze" (69SE), a statisioally significant greater
number (78%) think it at least somewhat important to keep
pace with the Soviets in the actual number of nuclear
weapons available. This reflects an understandable desire
to lessen the risk of war, but without taking the chance of
unilaterally weakening the U.S. militarily in relation to
the USSR. The distrust and dislike for the Soviets implicit
within that response is also reflected in the data collected
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in response to the following question (data listed is in
percentages)
:
(CI "Would you be willing to risk the destruction of the
united States rather than be dominated by the Russians,
or not?" [Ref . 91 : p. 31]
WOULD BE WILLING TO RISK DESTRUCTION 68
WOULD NOT BE WILL TO RISK DESTRUCTION 32
c. Assessing the Implications of the Data
Taken as a whole, the above survey information
indicates a public desire for an and to the nuclear arms
race (item A) coupled with the willingness to maintain the
U.S. arsenal (item B) and even risk its use to defend the
American way of life (item C) . There would appear then to
be areas that support for MX production could be built upon,
if the strong but contradictory desires of the public can be
satisfied.
What is not immediately apparent, however, is
the cause (or causes) of the sudden jump in support for the
MX program between January and June of 1983. As noted,
support for the "nuclear freeze" was still strong at the
time
.
Was the shift a result of a conscious and
successful effort made on the policymaking level to increase
public backing despite "freeze" sentiment to the contrary?
This can best be discussed after examining the information
in the following subsection.
2 . Unpubl ishe d Public Opinion Data Related t o
„
the MX
As was mentioned earlier, President Reagan had
scrapped the mobile basing plan for the MX when he came into
office. He had, in fact, made this a campaign issue during
the election [ Ref, 92: p. 9]. Mr. Reagan had not, however.
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questioned actually building the missile itself. Subsequent
basing proposals in 1981 by the President, one to use
existing Minuteman silos [ Ref . 93] and the other based on
the "Dense Pack" concept, were turnsd down by Congress. Low
public support for the MX program, which was in seeming
disarray, could logically be expected.
Interestingly though, in April 1981 and March/April
1982, private public opinion surveys regarding the MX were
conducted at the request of an unspecified O.S. government
agency or government sponsored contractor. 11 The first was
conducted while the "Dense Pack" basing discussion was
taking place. The second was taken after CSB had run into
heavy opposition in the Congress. Both point to specific
areas of public concern that could be targeted to obtain and
maintain public support for the MX. The actual survey
results follow. Also note the way the survey questions are
phrased, as it reveals a potential for "skewing" the
responses given. 12
a. April 1981 Survey Findings
The questions, data, analysis, and comments
listed below [ labeled (A) through (E) ] are excerpted
directly from the survey source [Bef. 91] :
ll All public opinion survey data cited in this subsec-
tion was obtained by telephonic request through the U.S. Air
Force Office of the Special Assistant for M-X in Washington,
D. C. Some of this data is deemed to be proprietary and none
of it should therefore be reproduced for use outside of U.S.
government channels without first obtaining guidance from
the Office of the Special Assistant for M-X.
l2This kind of problem is well recognized by the various
?ublic opinion polling organizations. See George H. Gallup,
he Gallup, _Poll: Public Op inion 1980 (Wilmington, Del:
scholarly Resources, Tnc7, T9*BTr7~
"~PP« xxii-xxxi for adiscussion of this subject. While the methodology used by
Cambridge Reports, Inc. in its construction of the questions
found on the following pages is unknown, it is assumed that




(A) When presented with a basic outline of the MX
Missile project and deployment plans, a majority (nearly




(B) The following guestion was posed to respondents and
the responses are listed below:
"President Ronald Reagan and his administration are
conducting a thorough review of all options for building
the MX. If, after completing this report. President
Reagan determines that the current plan to build the MX
in the deserts of Utah and Nevada [i.e., CSB ] is the
best opticn available, would you be more inclined or
less inclined to support it?"
Mere inclined 73%
Less inclined 16%
Fully 85% of those who think the MX system is a good
idea are positively influenced by this argument, as are
51% of those who think it's a bad idea, and 67% of those
who don't know.
(C) "If you knew that the current plan for building MX
represents the culmination of more than a decade of
study, including the strategic and cost analyses of more
than 50 different alternatives, by the Department of
Defense, Congress, and independent scientific authori-
ties, would you be more or less inclined to support it?"
Mere inclined 59%
Less inclined 23%
(D) Facts related to cost also sway large numbers of
people
:
"If you knew what, once the impact of inflation has been
taken into account, the cost or the MX missile system is
actually less than the cost of military defense systems
built by ths U.S. in %he 1960's and 19v0's would you be
more inclined or less inclined to support it?"
More inclined 71%
Less inclined 16%
Fully 85% of the MX supporters become more inclined to
support it using the cost argument, as are more than 4
in 10 .of those who initially think its a bad idea and
two-thirds of those who say they ion't know.
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(E) A similar level of support is achieved when the
public is exposed to the fact that MX is compatable with
SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]:
"If you knew that the MX missile system would be built
in a way that was compatible with possible future arms
control agreements with the Soviet union, would you be
more inclined or less inclined to support it?"
More inclined 72%
Less inclined 17%
More than 80% of those who think the MX is a good idea
are more inclined tc support it when given this informa-
tion. Even more significantly, a solid majority of
those who think it is ^..bad idea_and_>two51Hirgs of_t nose
wiTTi .np. opini'onT are more""incTTneI~to
i
su ppo r£""t7re sy ste m
wKen_giyen EKis, informat ion . "fempE'asrs tiTeirsF"
b. March/April 1982 Survey Findings
The guestions, data, analysis, and comments
listed below [labeled (F) through (M) ] are excerpted
directly from the survey source [Ref. 95] :
(F) The Issue Environment
We began our survey by asking respondents to tell
us--in their own words— what they think are the two most
important problems facing the United States
today. ... jobs and the allied issues of inflation and the
economy dominate the list. In fact, these "pocketbook"
concerns account for 63% of all "first responses" and
38% of all "second responses". Immediately following
these issues is a concern fcr "keeping out of war", and
"avoiding World War III". This issue garners 20% of
combined first and second responses and is the fourth
most often mentioned concern on the list. Moreover, the
sixth most often mentioned issue centers around
"foreign" affairs. This surge of interest in strategic
and foreign policy issues is probably a result of the
recent events, heavily discussed by the media, such as
the nuclear freeze movement and increased defense
expenditures.
(G) "Some people say that in this time of high federal
budget deficits, we can't afford to spend the funds to
develop the new MX missile system. Other people say
that since our present land-based missiles are vulner-
able tc a Soviet attack, we must spend what is necessary
to develop the new MX missile system. Which of these
two views is closest to your own opinion?"
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Can't afford to develop MX 44%
(Don't know) 4
Must spend funds necessary
to develop MX 53
(H) Our next question outlined the interim MX basing
Ian proposed By President Reagan. We explained that
he President wants forty missiles to be deployed in
existina missile silos and asked people whether they
generally favor or oppose this interim basing plan. As
the table shows, almost six Americans in ten support the
President's proposal, with four in ten opposed. A scant
3% remain undecided on this question.
I
"Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan have all endorsed
lans for developing the MX missile system, although
hey have all had different plans on where and how to
base the system. President Reagan has proposed an
interim method of basing the MX until a permanent method
has been selected. This interim plan would include
f
building forty MX missiles and placing them in existing




placing the vulnerable missiles we now
y, do you favor or oppose this interim
i
Favor 57%
(Don 1 t know) 3
Oppose 40
I) Respondents were also informed of President Reagan's
ecision to study three alternate final basing modes for
the MX while continuing the testing and production of
the actual missiles. we then offered two judgements of
this approach--whether we should or shouldn't spend any
development funds until final basing is decided— and
asked people which was closer to their own position. As
the table shows, a slim majority opt for spending the
money for testing and production. while 44% think we
shouldn't spend the money until a permanent basing
method is selected.
"The Administration has also proposed a further study on
three different methods for a permanent way of basing
the MX missiles. While this study has been going on.
President Reagan has proceeded to spend funds to
develop, test, and produce the new MX missile. Some
people say that we shouldn't spend any money until a
permanent basing method has been selected. Other people
say that we should continue to spend money to test and
produce the MX missile so that when a permanent basing
method has been selected, the MX missile will be avail-
able and ready to base. Which of these two views is
closest to your own opinion?"
Shouldn't spend money until permanent
basing method is selected 44%
(Don't know) 4
Should continue to spend money for
testing and production 52
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(J) When the MX missile system is explained in the
context of President Reagan's .defense modernization
EI
ogram to help insure the survivability of our land-
sed defense forces, nearly two-thirds of all Americans
say they favor it. As the table shows, exactly one-
third oppose the development of the MX in this context,
and—once again— very few are undecided.
"Part of President Reagan's defense modernization
program is to build the new MX missile system. Most
experts agree that our current land-based missiles are
vulnerable to Soviet attack. The MX missile system is
intended to make our land-based defense forces stronger
and increase their survivability in the event of a
Soviet attack. Generally, do you favor or oppose the
development of the MX missile system?"
Favor 65%
(Don* t know) 3
Oppose 33
(K) Almost two of every three Americans (65%) agree that
continued development of the MX is necessary to insure a
strong bargaining position with the Soviets on arms
reduction. As the next table shows, one in three people
disagree with such a contention.
"The Reagan Administration is currently planning to
begin arms negotiations with the Soviet union aimed at
arms reduction. President Reagan argues that we have to
proceed with building and testing the MX system because
a halt in development of the MX would weaken our
bargaining position with the Soviets. Do you strongly
agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the
President's argument that we must continue to develop
the MX system so that we can go into the arms reduction






(L) Knowledge of three Presidential endorsements
(Ford/Carter/Reagan), and the consensus of several
Congresses as well as the Department of Defense, makes
nearly three-quarters of our national sample more
inclined to support the MX missile. This very closely
parallels the result we found in an April 1981 national
survey, which asked a similar question.
"If you knew that Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan,
along with several OS Congresses and the Department of
Defense, have all agreed that the United States needs
the MX missile to improve our national defense, would









All in all. a majority (53%) of Americans support
the development of the MX missila system, though many
(44%) question whether the nation can afford its costs,
when information dealing with tha vulnerability of tha
present land-based system is introduced, more people are
moved to support the system. Of particular note is the
effectiveness of information noting that three
Presidents and a succession of US Congresses have
supported the MX system as an improvement of the
nation's defenses.
c. Assessing the Implications of the Data
The private surveys pinpoint the style of argu-
ments and presentations that can build support for the MX.
If given a "full" explanation of the MX system, the public
was more apt to think of it as a "good idea" (item A) .
Beyond that, the knowledge that tha MX plans had received a
thorough review increased the inclination to support them
(items B,C,H). Presidential endorsements of a plan were
also valuable (item L)
.
General concern over pricas and economics (item
F) which might be tied to supporting an expensive missile
system can be allayed if incorporated into the context of
allowing for inflation; and the necessity of building a
system less vulnerable than the current ICBM system (items
D,E) . In fact, spending on the MX can garner support even
if a permanent basing plan has not been found, as long as
there is a study going on to determine a basing mode (item
I).
The public* s desire to deal with the Soviet
Union from a position of strength during arms reduction
negotiations provided a particularly powerful way of
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obtaining support for building tha MX even during a time
when the "nuclear freeze" was attracting heavy media atten-
tion (items E,F,K). Also still vary useful are justifica~
tions related to ICBM modernization and survivability (item
J).
The potential to create a "package" of arguments
and presentations with broad public appeal is clearly iden-
tifiable within the above data. Such an approach could be
used then to strengthen the strategic policies of the Reagan
Administration and help overcome continuing congressional
resistance to the MX (Bef. 96: pp. 1-3] by obtaining the
impetus of favorable public opinion.
It should be reinterated here that the major
object of the effort is to get the large, modern, MX missile
"in the field" as quickly as possible to revitalize the
land-based leg of the "Triad". Ths basing mode itself, so
often the major cause of controversy, public misunder-
standing, and delay, is, in a sense, secondary.
3. Put tin g Al l the Da t a Toge thsr
Considering all the data just presented, any expres-
sion of policy expected to gain, maintain, or increase
public support for the MX program obviously must deal
directly with some (or preferably all) of the following
elements:
1) Arms control/"nuclear fraeze" issues must be
addressed when advocating MX production (a major point)
.
2) U.S. nuclear strength compared to Soviet nuclear
strength will be kept in equilibrium.
3) Dealing with the Soviet? from a position of
strength and resisting any coercion by them will be firm
policy goals.
4) The cost of the program is not unreasonable in view
of the need for it as a component of the national
defense (a major pcint)
.
co
5) Other programs to improve the ICBM system will
ntmue, but the currently recommended missile is the
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best available now and is far better than what is now
being used.
Additionally, the endorsement of the president and implying
that the problem was carefully studied before a policy was
decided upon clearly aids in promoting national support. 13
Now that a sort of "MX public opinion support check-
list" has been established, there is another guestion to
examine. Was this "checklist", or one similar to it, a
factor in the current articulation of desired nuclear
strategy?
C. THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION FINDINGS
It cannot be proven (or disproven) that a synthesis of
the public opinion data cited above (both published and
unpublished) has been used by the Reagan Administration in
its efforts to force final congressional approval for the
MX. The published data was obviously available to anyone.
The unpublished data was available to almost anyone with
governmental ties. It was certainly in the possession of at
least one agency (the OSAF) that would be interested in
seeing it used to gain public support, since the MX is an
Air Force program.
13 It may well be that the failure of former President
Carter to gain the wide spread public approval for his MX
basing plan (the "racetrack") , with the subseguent failure
of the plan to achieve Congressional support, was given
impetus by his rejection of the Defense Science Board recom-
mendations. That board, which included a number of
respected scientists, had carefully studied the MX basing
mode problem and did not support the plan that President
Carter set forth on September 7, 1979 [Ref. 97: p. 91].
This was followed by the President's decision to alter his
own "approved" basing plan nine months later, again without
benefit of a perceivable "careful study". The image being
projected to the public was that the MX basing plan had
problems that had not yet been resolved. This was not a
good sianal to send during the international and economic
maelstroms occurring at the time (see the chronology in
Chapter Three)
.
To date, even though the Reagan
Administration has changed its planned basing mode, an
effort has been made to maintain the impression that the
announced alterations were done after "careful study".
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It can be assumed, therefore, that these data (or some
similar to it) were made available to the White House and
the Scowcroft Commission in an effort to buttress the
campaign for the MX. If the Commission found (as have four
presidents) that the MX is a useful strategic tool, then the
statements of the Commission (as well as the actions of
President Reagan) should reveal an appreciation of what
would be necessary to gain public support for it. If so,
then it could be said that a component of proposed U.S.
nuclear strategy was being articulated in a manner that
public opinion polls had indicated was acceptable to the
American people.
It would be foolish, of course, to assume that an entire
strategic concept would be based solely on what the policy-
makers perceived the public would accept. However, the
worth of Bernard Brodie's and Edward Mead Earle»s previously
cited comments on the importance of the public in the
strategy forming process would be lent a great deal of
credibilty and the place of public opinion in the strategic
planning process considerably elevated. The next step then




d i d t he Commi s sion .say?
In April 19 83, after the ABC News/Washington Post
poll showing less than majority public support for the MX,
but two months before the poll showing a shift in opinion,
the Scowcroft Commission report was released. As noted
earlier, the Commission was formed by President Reagan after
the failure to win support for previously proposed MX basing
plans. It was to carefully study the options available and
make recommendations, thus fulfilling a requirement of the
"MX public opinion support checklist".
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The findings of the Commission in regard to the
MX/ICBM force are guoted below. Emphasis has been added by
this author to indicate specific portions pertaining to the
"support checklist" . The numbers in parentheses following
each paragraph refer to the specific points of the "check-
list" that have been addressed:
There ar e
,
imp orta nt need s on several grounds for
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2 . Cou ld i t i nfluence
.
public opinion?
Obviously, the five elements of the "checklist" have
been covered in the report. The concern for arms control is
prominently addressed. References to the maintenance of
O.S. strength and resistance to coercion are present. To
deal from a position of strength with the Soviets, the
already available MX is shown to be a necessity. The cost
of the MX system is cast in the most favorable possible
light. The MX itself is described as the best currently
available program, badly needed to replace older systems.
Yes, another system is needed, but it will not fulfill the
present needs of the U.S.
Finally, upon receiving the report of his commis-
sion, President Reagan vigorously supported all of its find-
ings [Ref. 99: pp. 1, 11 ]. By so doing he completed the
final reguirement of the "checklist". In terms of gaining
public opinion support for the MX, no known effective key
had been left unturned.
D. INTERPRETATION
Conceivably by accident but probably by design, a facet
of strategy was articulated in a manner that was fully in
consonance with public opinion. Does this explain why
support shifted in favor of the MX after the Commissions
report was released?
It would be naive to say it was the only factor
involved. Be that as it may, the assumption that the public
was made generally aware of the recommendations and
reasoning of the Commission in the course of the extensive
media coverage of the MX problem at the time cannot be
discounted. That the content of the report lends itself to
building public support has been shown. That the trend of
support shifted is a matter of record. It is not unreason-
able to infer a connection.
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But how necessary was this apparent public opinion
support building effort? Should ths Administration continue
stating its MX policy in its new form?
Consider the fact that a Harris Poll conducted after the
Commission report was released showed 53 percent of the
respondents were opposed to the MX [Ref. 100]. How did the
Harris Pell differ from the ABC News/Washington Post survey
which showed a plurality in favor of the MX? ABC measured
opinion only among the roughly 86 percent of the respondents
who claimed to know about the system. The other poll noted
responses from the entire sample set, regardless^of any
prior kn owledg e. Even so, the Harris results represented a
five percentage point drop in negative reactions from a
similar poll six months earlier, while approval for MX rose
six percentage points to 41 peroent [Ref. 101]. Such
differences can be significant when congressional approval
for MX funds is requested, as the fight over the system is
not yet over [Ref. 102]. The need for the White House to
continue its af forts to gain and maintain support is there-
fore clear.
What is not clear is whether U.S. nuclear strategy has
suffered because of all this. The recommendations previ-
ously cited from the Scowcroft Commission report at the end
of subsection A-3 of this chapter were a compendium of the
arguments for not building the MX. Yat, the need to obtain
support for what many planners see as a necessary strategic
program apparently forced the Commission to include them in
its report, touting them as the necessary follow-ons to the
MX system rather than as a justification for stopping MX
production. Obviously though there is some merit in the
anti-MX arguments.
The use of existing silos for the MX was not considered
by some Commission members to be ths optimal strategic plan.
The mobile system was thought to be militarily better. As
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was revealed in an interview subsequent to the release of
the Commission report, "...that option was precluded, Mr.
Scowcroft said, by 'the nature of the environment in which
the decision was made. 1 " [Hef. 103: p. 1]
It appears that the decision has been made to get what
is attainable to ensure the survival of the MX in some form.
Public opinion must continue to be curried so that an appre-
ciable level of popular support can be claimed. The
elements of the "checklist" must and will continue to be
emphasized. Secretary Weinberger's shift of emphasis in
deterrence policy (see subsection A-3) from survivability to
a display of national will to the enemy bears this out.
The need and desire for public support has been acknowl-
edged by the actions of the policymakers. The problems of
presenting the complexity of the issue to the public have
been allowed for by selectively tailoring the content of the
explanation to cover the areas where public concern is
considered most probable. Thus, a means to create the most
support is obtained.
Yet, this way of answering the question asked back in
Chapter One, and alluded to by the end of Chapter Three;
about how the support of public opinion can be obtained even
in a complex issue; may be flawed. The conclusion of this
paper will deal with that issue.
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V- glHAL THOOGHTS, QOESTIOMS. S SUGGESTIONS
The problem of gaining and maintaining public opinion
support for strategic policies in an era characterized by
the rapid exchange cf information will continue to plague
American policymakers. Some, such as historian Barbara
Tuchman, would not consider this to be a problem. She
contends that the public may be better equipped to go to the
heart of problems rather than the policymakers. Tuchman
feels that leaders may be prevented by the trappings of
office from utilizing "common sense." [Eef. 104; pp. 1P,
3P]. Richard Pipes captured the complexity that underlies
Tuchman 's phrase when he made the following statement:
. . .understanding, being a product of intellectual
Erocesses, concerns itself with ends, with what needs to
e done; authority, on the other hand, involving as it
does the management of men. belongs to the realm of
applied arts, and tends to become preoccupied with
means. Sometimes this preoccupation grows so obsessive
that those in power lose sight o£ the whole purpose to
which power has been given them. The more ambitious an
undertaking, the mere people involved in it, the greater
the likelihood that overconcern with the means will
produce stupendous mismanagement. (Hence Santayana's
definition of fanaticism as "redoubling one's efforts
after one has forgotten one's aims.")
All of which is meant to explain my temerity in
presenting a critique of policies of statesmen whose
intentions are no worse than mine, but who also happen
to have access to information iniccessable to me. The
great merit of free public opinion is that it acts as a
corrective to statesmanship by raising questions of
purpose, all too often obscured by concerns with
implementation, [fief. 105: p. 48]
If one can accept that the public itself plays a iarqe
role in determining the national interest, how can the poli-
cymakers justify tailoring their pronouncements to the
people in such a manner as to gain public support? The
argument that an undirected public mood is too volatile to
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be of use in the policyf orming process [ Bef - 106: p. 376]
does not recognize the strengths o£ the democratic process.
The eminent public opinion analyst George Gallup, presaging
the comments by Tuchman and Pipes, described the situation
in this manner, even before the advsnt of truly rapid infor-
mation exchange:
In a democracy such as ours the incontrovertible
fact remains that the majority of citizens usually
registers sound judgement on issues, even though a good
many are ignorant and uninformed. [Eef- 107: p. 74 ](emphasis guoted)
Lincoln's dictum on the necessity for public opinion
support if a policy was to survive (see Section II-D) was
probably not conceived with the understanding that the
information available to the publio was to be "managed" by
the government. 14 Nor does it appsar that his statement,
over time, has ever been shown to bs wrong.
The public must support the policies and actions of
those they have entrusted with the responsibility of
protecting the national interest if these policies and
actions are to continue. That the public must be able to
l4 Nor, in a related matter, does the news media have a
right to selectively present information in order to advo-
cate certain positions. See Ernest w. Lefever,
tion and the rise of the "media elite". Additionally,
government sensitivity to the impact of the media on public
opinion was highlighted during the recent U.S. military
action in Grenada. For a sampling of the various viewpoints
on the role of the media brought forth by the Grenada inci-
dent, see: Henry Grunwald, "Trying to Censor Reality,"
Time, November 7, 1983; George F. Will, "The Price of
Power." Newsweek, November 7, 1983; Jonathan Friendly,
"Panel of~13t"ficers and Journalists to Review Grenada Press
Limits," New York T imes , November 7. 1983; and Caspar
Weinberger , "^Secrecy is sometimes the best policy," (written
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obtain sufficient information to be able to discern, by
whatever means it chcoses, that the national interest is
being served is obvious.
In writing his opinion in the celebrated "Pentagon
Papers" case, Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black noted:
Secrecy in government is fundamentally undemocratic
rpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate an
scussion of public issues are vital to our national
Legitimate security concerns notwithstanding, proponents
of the concepts of obscuring or even "stonewalling" an issue
that has become a matter of public attention have short
memories. Others have also felt that such tactics will
ultimately cause the public to forget about a particular
situation, allowing "business as usual" to continue. The
end of the Nixon Presidency shows the final result of the
loss of public support for policies and actions that are
perceived to be unacceptable.
To increase public support for its strategic concepts
and to ensure their continuation, it is not necessary
however that the policymakers articulate or formulate their
plans in a manner slavishly attuned to public opinion.
Rather, policymaking must reflect a greater appreciation of
the mood of the people along with some respect for their
common sense. Events and pronouncements may alter the
public mood, but to disregard the public's ability to think
for itself is to risk the loss of support for, and the final
destruction of, policies that the government feels are
vital.
In the case of arms sales, what means exists to increase
support for this unpopular issue? What must the government
do since it dsems the policy to be in the national interest?
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Return to the investigation of arms sales support.
Andrew J. Pierre 1 s comments citei in Chapter Three were
confirmed. Public support for arms sales in general has
been low. If fact, it has never gone above 4 percent. The
key to the problem of gaining the desired majority of public
opinion support can be discovered, however, by looking at
another set of statistics.
Looking back at the statistics for the years 1975, 1976,
and 1978, one can see that adding the percentage of people
who would support arms sales on an "IT DEPENDS" basis to the
percentage of those who generally found arms sales accep-
table, yields an interesting result. In all three cases,
the sum almost counterbalances, and in one case exceeds, the
percentage of these opposed to any arms sales. For 1980 and
1981, the sums far exceed the percentage of those opposed.
For the entire eight year span, an additional 13 to 21
percent of the public was amenable to arms sales providing
certain conditions^w ere met
.
If such is the case, the Reagan Administration can
expect more public support for its arms sale policy if it
continues to relate that policy to the maintenance of world
stability as it relates to the Onited States. While seme
effort has apparently been made in the formulation of the
policy to accomplish this [Ref. 109], the question becomes
whether the right general audience has been targeted.
With a concerted effort to convince the sizable group
who already conditionally support arms sales that a broader
approach is needed to insure U.S. security and world peace,
the potential to gain a majority of support exists.
Attaining such a demonstrable majority could effectively
silence most critics of the presidents policy.
The judgements tc be made are:
1. Is the arms sale policy and its attendant strategy




2. Is the policy itself sound and could it stand up to
public scrutiny?
In the case of the MX missile, the "public opinion
support checklist" turns out to be little more than a
restatement of the questions that Herman Kahn and Anthony J.
Wiener tell us that any government should ask itself before
acquiring a new weapons system. These are:
1. What will X do that the currently programmed U.S.
posture will net dc?
2. Why is it worth doing?
3. What is the impact of doing X on the O.S.S.R.; our
allies; the "arms race" generally?
4. What is the cost-effectiveness analysis?
[Ref. 110: p. 82, Table 7]
Surely the questions to be asked in both cases can be seen
as pragmatic considerations. 15 It is just that kind of prag-
matic approach that has been expected of the policymakers by
the public since the inception of the United States. And it
is the pragmatism of the public in having that expectation
that lies at the heart of Lincoln's dictum.
In America, where public opinion is so integral a part
of the governmental process and where information can move
literally at the speed of light, the basis for the policy-
makers* attempts to obtain public support should be a
l5 In a more parochial consideration, the U.S. Navy would
do well to remember the necessity to ask itself similarly
fundamental questions before fully deploying the nuclear
land-attack version of the Tomahawk cruise missile. Vessels
which have heretofore been classified as tactical systems
will take on true strategic significance. Previously
amiable foreign countries and even some U.S. cities may be
reluctant to play host to such vessels. Arms control nego-
tiations may be seriously affected. Terrorist attacks on
ships overseas may become more attractive to forces hostile
to u.s. interests. These potential problems must be consid-
ered in the formulation of a strategy for the deployment and
Sotential use of such nuclear missiles. If this is not
one. the public may be unable or unwilling to support that
strategy should such difficulties arise.
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reasoned dissemination of information supported by trust in
and respect for the American people. If the perception of
the leadership is that policy and strategy can or must be
marketed like a tube of toothpaste, then the actual contri-
bution to the national interest of those policies and strat-
egies, and the guality of the policymakers themselves, must
be questioned.
That the public's grasp of a problem or policy is deemed
too general does not permit the policymakers to ignore the
concerns of the populace. Such an argument is too easy to
make if a policy is ultimately contradictory or not well
thought out. In the words of Thomas Jefferson:
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of
society but the people themselves; and if we think them
not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a
wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion by education.
[Ref. 111: p. 214]
Neither Jefferson's words nor the study of public
opinion polls offer easy or foolproof methods for policy-
makers to gain or maintain the support of the public over
the long haul. What is apparent, however, is that the speed
by which information is transmitted in this "electronic age"
places a far greater burden upon the leadership to clearly
state its goals, and its plans for achieving them. Without
so doing, the government leaves its actions open to misin-
terpretation by the public without the buffer of time to
permit adjustments. Thoughtful, consistent, long term plan-
ning, well articulated to the public, must replace a d hoc
problem solving methodologies.
To successfully meet this challenge can usher in new
dimensions for the concept of the American democratic
process. To fail to recognize the challenge as anything
other than "business as usual" means that a genuine
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opportunity to more fully involve the American people in the
decisions that affect thsir lives will be lost and states-
manship will inevitably be replaced with salesmanship.
A. A BOTE TO WOOLD-BE STRATEGIC PLANNERS
This paper has endeavored to reveal an aspect of the
strategic planning process many might feel to be of little
importance. As was shown by the two case studies, means can
be found for the government to obtain public support without
having to change its actual policy or strategic goals. By
extrapolation then, the articulation of "the national
interest" seemingly also falls wholly to the policymakers'
discretion, as the public input to that process would also
be malleable. The Jeffersonian model of a democracy
nurtured by the free flow of information may have been over-
whelmed by the vast guantities of often conflicting data now
available to the public.
Yet, to accept this rather colily logical assessment of
the situation, which is attractive in terms of expediency,
exacts a high cost. If the American ideal of government
truly "by the people" must consistently be denied in order
to obtain what is "best" for the country, then it must be
asked just what or whose purpose is being served by the
policymakers* actions. At what point does the unigue exper-
iment that is America become irretrivably debased? To
accept the tactics of expediency is to lose the strategy of
American democracy.
It is, therefore, incumbent upon the strategic planner
to consider public opinion in the course of the planning
process. However, as noted in Chapter One, just how public
opinion fits into the decisionmaking system remains an unan-
swered question. It is possible this question is ultimately
unanswerable. The impact of public opinion may conceivably
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be like the impact of sunspots on an electronics experiment;
somewhat predictable, not always significant, potentially
damaging, but not to be ignored.
The assurance that public opinion does have a place in
the strategic planning process, despite its amorphous char-
acter, does exist however. In one instance, it comes from
someone who has just recently departed a position in
Washington, D.C. that can accurately be described as being
that of a "strategic planner".
Retired General Edward Meyer, who served as the Army
Chief of Staff from 1980 to 1982, recently commented on a
key ingredient for the achievement of 0. S. goals and
policies:
In order for us to be successful, it is absolutely vital
that we have the support of the nation as a whole...
[Ref. 112]
Note that General Meyer does not refer to the necessity for
the support of "elites", "attentive publics", or special
interest groups. Further, his means of obtaining public
support, at least for the military (and arguably then for
all strategic planners as well) comes from the underlying
concept expressed in the following statement:
To mold public opinion, we must b e professio nal {in the
art of war.} [Ref. 113] (empTiasis adaeaT
There is no mention cf public opinion manipulation, media
control, or secrecy. Rather, the emphasis is on "profes-
sionalism"; a complex concept involving thoughtful, logical
planning with attention to detail, consideration of all
"knowable" factors concerning a situation, an appreciation
of what is "do-able", and an articulatable understanding of
the goals to be achieved plus the logic behind them.
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Meyers statements frame the ultimate public opinion
related problems for the strategic planner. They are:
1) Does/Will the public support the current policy,
strategy, or goal? Does the public perceive that the
strategy is being, or can be, effectively carried out?
2) If not, why? Just as importantly; if so, why?
3) If the public does not support the strategy, do
ey need a clearer
need to be changed?
th \ explanation or does the strategy
4) If the public supports the strategy now, what might
cause that support to erode or suddenly dissipate? Does
this reveal a flaw in the strategy?
To be mindful of these guestions is to gain the key to
understanding the difference between the generally favorable
public reaction to and support for the recent O.S. action in
Grenada as opposed to the continued questioning of the
American presence in Lebanon. Unfortunately, easily found
or "standard" answers to these questions as they relate to a
specific circumstance cannot be expected. The demonstated
dynamics of the public opinion forming process will always
require the strategic planner to find new answers for these
questions each time they are asked. But to have those
answers will lead tc strategies and policies which can be
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